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INTRODUCTION 
This Comment examines the underlying tension between bank-
ruptcy law and intellectual property law in the context of nonexclusive 
patent licenses.  The tension arises when a patent owner (i.e., a licen-
sor)1 grants a license for its patent and the licensee2 files for bank-
ruptcy under Chapter 11 of the United States Bankruptcy Code3 while 
the license is still in effect.  In a traditional Chapter 11 filing, the deb-
tor-licensee assumes an asset (here, the patent license) by becoming a 
debtor-in-possession4 and is then free to assign the asset to another 
 
1 The terms “patent owner” and “licensor” are used interchangeably throughout 
this Comment. 
2 For the purposes of this Comment, the licensee will always be the debtor party 
filing for bankruptcy. 
3 Chapter 11 filings are typically used by businesses seeking reorganization.  See 11 
U.S.C. § 1101 (2006); WILLIAM D. WARREN & DANIEL J. BUSSEL, BANKRUPTCY 22 (8th 
ed. 2009) (“Chapter 11 may be used by both individuals and firms, but is designed 
primarily for business firms.”). 
4 Section 1107 of the Bankruptcy Code provides that a debtor-in-possession has 
the rights, powers, and fiduciary obligations of a standard Chapter 11 trustee.  See 11 
U.S.C. § 1107.  For a definition of a Chapter 11 trustee, see infra note 42 and accom-
panying text.  
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entity in order to facilitate its restructuring and reorganization plan.5  
From the licensor’s perspective, however, the debtor-licensee is not 
free to assign the license because it is nontransferable.  Furthermore, 
patent law’s fundamental “right to exclude” principle allows the pa-
tent owner to sue for patent infringement in the absence of a license 
agreement.6  Thus, the question becomes whether a debtor-licensee 
should be allowed to continue operating under its license once it files 
for bankruptcy, or if a conflict in bankruptcy and patent law should 
prevent the debtor-licensee from assuming and using the license.  If the 
debtor-licensee’s ability to use an essential asset is subject to conflicting 
law, then neither the licensor nor the licensee can be sure of its rights. 
With technology at the forefront of today’s economy, many com-
panies increasingly rely on technology licenses in order to conduct 
their businesses.  Unsurprisingly, the right to continue using intellec-
tual property licenses—in particular, patent licenses—is critical to the 
survival of a distressed debtor.  Most importantly, the debtor-licensee’s 
assured ability to assume and assign the license will determine wheth-
er it will be able to successfully obtain financing or even continue op-
erations after undergoing a Chapter 11 filing. 
Part I of this Comment outlines the considerations of Chapter 11 
bankruptcy law relating to patent licenses and a debtor-licensee’s in-
terests.  Part II identifies the competing interests of patent law.  Part 
III explores the various approaches courts have taken to address the 
conflict between bankruptcy and patent law, focusing on the devel-
opment of the two main tests that courts have adopted to resolve the 
conflict.  In addition, Part III examines the recent case law trends in 
some bankruptcy courts.  Part IV investigates the statutory interpreta-
tion and legislative history of section 365(c) of the Bankruptcy Code 
and focuses on why the literal reading of the statute should prevail.  
Part V discusses how the literal reading of section 365(c) enables pa-
tent rights to be a form of creditor protection against the competing 
interests of a strong bankruptcy policy. 
 
5 In bankruptcy law, assumption and assignment of patent licenses are governed 
by 11 U.S.C. § 365 because patent licenses are considered “executory contracts.”  See 
infra Part I.  
6 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2006); DAVID A. BURGE, PATENT AND TRADEMARK:  TAC-
TICS AND PRACTICE § 11-7, at 124 (3d ed. 1999). 
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I.  EXECUTORY CONTRACTS IN BANKRUPTCY LAW 
A.  Contracts as Property of the Bankruptcy Estate 
Bankruptcy law relies on the concept of freely assignable rights of 
property in order to facilitate the restructuring and reorganization of 
the debtor.7  In particular, Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code tries to 
preserve the ongoing value of the business and maximize the econom-
ic return to all constituents of the business.8  At its heart, a business is 
no more than a series of contracts enabling the development, produc-
tion, or sale of a good or service.  Putting aside a company’s physical 
assets (e.g., land, buildings, equipment, inventory), the majority of a 
company’s value comes from its contracts with its creditors, distribu-
tors, suppliers, customers, and the like. 
Section 541 of the Bankruptcy Code provides that a bankruptcy es-
tate is created upon the filing of a bankruptcy petition.9  The bankruptcy 
estate is considered to have a separate legal existence than that of the 
debtor who filed the case.10  The Bankruptcy Code defines “property of 
the estate” as all of the debtor’s legal and equitable interests in property 
as of the bankruptcy petition’s filing date.11  Courts have interpreted a 
debtor’s bankruptcy estate to include the debtor’s contractual rights.12  
In the case of a debtor business filing for Chapter 11, the bankruptcy es-
tate includes the debtor’s physical assets as well as the debtor’s contracts 
with any creditors, distributors, suppliers, customers, and the like.13 
 
7 See 3 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 317(2) (1981) (allowing for the 
assignment of contractual rights except in specific cases such as illegality or undue 
hardship); see also Shaw Group, Inc. v. Bechtel Jacobs Co. (In re IT Group), 350 B.R. 
166, 177 (Bankr. D. Del. 2006) (“The [Bankruptcy] Code generally favors free assigna-
bility as a means to maximize the value of the debtor’s estate and, to that end, allows 
the [debtor] to assign notwithstanding a provision in the contract or lease, or applica-
ble law, prohibiting, restricting, or conditioning assignment.” (second alteration in 
original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting L.R.S.C. Co. v. Rickel Home 
Ctrs., Inc. (In re Rickel Home Ctrs., Inc.), 209 F.3d 291, 299 (3d Cir. 2000))). 
8 See, e.g., United States v. Whiting Pools, Inc., 462 U.S. 198, 203 (1983) (discuss-
ing the principles behind the reorganization provisions of the Bankruptcy Code and 
how “Congress anticipated that the business would continue to provide jobs, to satisfy 
creditors’ claims, and to produce a return for its owners”).  
9 11 U.S.C. § 541(a). 
10 Id. 
11 See Whiting Pools, 462 U.S. at 203 (viewing section 541(a)(1) as “a definition of 
what is included in the estate, rather than as a limitation”).  
12 See, e.g., Quarles House Apartments v. Plunkett (In re Plunkett), 23 B.R. 392, 394 
(Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1982) (noting that courts have interpreted section 541 as “pro-
tect[ing] a debtor’s contractual right as an asset of the estate”).  
13 11 U.S.C. § 541(a).  
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B.  Patent Licenses as Executory Contracts 
The conflict between intellectual property and bankruptcy law 
arises from the Bankruptcy Code’s treatment of a special type of con-
tract, known as an “executory contract,” under section 365.14  Any con-
tracts that require, at the time of the bankruptcy petition filing, fur-
ther performance from each party are considered executory.15  In 
particular, nonexclusive licenses, such as those commonly found in 
patent licenses, are considered executory contracts within the mean-
ing of the Code.16  This is because both parties have continuing obli-
gations—in the case of a nonexclusive patent license, the licensor has 
a continuing obligation not to sue the licensee for infringement of its 
patent, and the licensee has a continuing obligation to commercialize 
the licensed invention.17 
With executory contracts, a debtor has three options:  (1) rejection 
of the contract, (2) assumption of the contractual obligations, or (3) 
assignment (i.e., transfer) of the contract.18  The ability to freely choose 
 
14 An executory contract is “a contract under which the obligation of both the bank-
rupt and the other party to the contract are so far unperformed that the failure of either 
to complete performance would constitute a material breach excusing the performance 
of the other.”  Vern Countryman, Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy:  Part I, 57 MINN. L. 
REV. 439, 460 (1973); see also Sharon Steel Corp. v. Nat’l Fuel Gas Distribution Corp., 872 
F.2d 36, 39 (3d Cir. 1989) (adopting Countryman’s definition of “executory contract”). 
15 See Unsecured Creditor’s Comm. of Robert L. Helms Constr. & Dev. Co. v. 
Southmark Corp. (In re Robert L. Helms Constr. & Dev. Co.), 139 F.3d 702, 705 (9th 
Cir. 1998) (defining an “executory contract” as one where both parties continue to 
have obligations under the contract such that failure to perform an obligation would 
be a material breach that would justify the other’s nonperformance).  
16 See, e.g., Lubrizol Enters., Inc. v. Richmond Metal Finishers, Inc. (In re Rich-
mond Metal Finishers, Inc.), 756 F.2d 1043, 1045 (4th Cir. 1985) (holding that a non-
exclusive patent license was an executory contract based on the “unperformed, con-
tinuing core obligations of notice and forbearance in licensing”). 
17 See David R. Kuney, Restructuring Dilemmas for the High Technology Licensee:  Will 
“Plain Meaning” Bring Order to the Chaotic Bankruptcy Law for Assumption and Assignment of 
Technology Licenses?, 44 GONZ. L. REV. 123, 135 (2008) (noting that in bankruptcy, pa-
tent licenses “are almost uniformly regarded as executory contracts”); Ann Livingston 
& Leif M. Clark, Technology Transfers:  What if the Other Party Files Bankruptcy?, 21 ST. 
MARY’S L.J. 173, 180-81 (1989) (“In the context of technology transfers, most agree-
ments will include continuing rights and duties by both parties and will be considered 
executory.”); Robert L. Tamietti, Technology Licenses Under the Bankruptcy Code:  A Licen-
see’s Mine Field, 62 AM. BANKR. L.J. 295, 301 (1988) (“[A] [patent] license must be ex-
ecutory throughout its term.  Each day the licensee uses the licensor’s technology, the 
licensor forebears its right to sue the licensee for conduct that ‘but for the license, 
would be an infringement.’” (quoting United States v. Studiengesellschaft Kohle, 
m.b.H., 670 F.2d 1122, 1127 (D.C. Cir. 1981))); see also infra Part II.  
18 See 11 U.S.C. § 1123(b)(2) (declaring that a debtor’s plan may, subject to section 
365, “provide for the assumption, rejection, or assignment of any executory contract”). 
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and exercise these three options is fundamental to a debtor’s ability to 
maximize the value of its assets during reorganization or restructuring. 
1.  Rejection of an Executory Contract 
The first option, rejection, is relatively straightforward.  The deb-
tor simply rejects the contracts it deems to be of low value or highly 
cumbersome to operate.19  Under section 365(g) of the Bankruptcy 
Code, the debtor’s trustee,20 with the approval of the bankruptcy 
court, may reject an executory contract.21  This rejection constitutes a 
breach of the contract, effective immediately prior to the debtor’s 
bankruptcy filing.22  In technology licensing cases, section 365(n) of 
the Bankruptcy Code provides a remedy for breach of contract if the 
debtor party is the licensor—in these cases, the nondebtor party may 
treat the license as terminated.23  Similarly, if the debtor party is the 
 
19 Section 365(g) of the Bankruptcy Code governs the rejection of an executory 
contract.  In order to reject an executory contract, the debtor must file a motion with 
the bankruptcy court.  FED. R. BANKR. P. 9014(a); see also 11 U.S.C. § 365(d) (listing the 
timing requirements for such a motion).  The court will consider the debtor’s motion 
for authority to reject an executory contract using the “business judgment rule,” which 
focuses on whether rejection of the executory contract would benefit the general un-
secured creditors of the debtor’s estate.  See, e.g., Robertson v. Pierce (In re Chi-Feng 
Huang), 23 B.R. 798, 800-01 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1982) (“We believe rejection of the bur-
densome test in favor of the ‘business judgment’ rule is dictated by logic as much as 
precedent. . . . The primary issue is whether rejection would benefit the general unse-
cured creditors.”).  Under the business judgment rule, the court will give great defe-
rence to the debtor’s decision to reject the contract and will not interfere with the de-
cision unless there is a showing of bad faith or abuse of discretion.  See Group of 
Institutional Investors v. Chi., Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pac. R.R., 318 U.S. 523, 550-51 
(1943) (holding that the Court will not upset business judgment “except on a clear 
showing that the limits of discretion have been exceeded”).  
20 The debtor-in-possession also has the ability to assume, reject, or assign an ex-
ecutory contract.  See infra note 42 and accompanying text.  
21 11 U.S.C. § 365(g). 
22 Id.; see also Agarwal v. Pomona Valley Med. Group, Inc. (In re Pomona Valley 
Med. Group, Inc.), 476 F.3d 665, 671 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that the debtor’s rejec-
tion of the executory contract “constituted a breach of that contract effective imme-
diately before [the debtor] filed for bankruptcy”).  
23 See In re EI Int’l, 123 B.R. 64, 66 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1991) (“The option consists of 
the licensee choosing either to terminate the agreement or to retain the rights to per-
formance by the other party under the agreement.”).  Notably, Congress amended the 
Bankruptcy Code after the Fourth Circuit’s decision in Lubrizol Enterprises, Inc. v. Rich-
mond Metal Finishers, Inc. (In re Richmond Metal Finishers, Inc.), 756 F.2d 1043 (4th Cir. 
1985).  In Lubrizol, the court recognized the difficulties that a licensee would face if the 
debtor-licensor rejected (and thus terminated) the patent license, noting that the pos-
sibility of rejection could have a “chilling effect” on intellectual property licensing by 
companies that did not have the strongest financial position.  Id. at 1048.  Recognizing 
the importance of intellectual property licenses, Congress passed the Intellectual 
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licensee, rejection of the license allows the nondebtor party to treat the 
license as terminated.24  Thus, regardless of whether the debtor is the 
patent licensor or licensee, if the debtor chooses to reject the license, 
the license will be deemed terminated.25 
2.  Assumption of an Executory Contract 
The situation becomes more complex if the debtor party wishes to 
assume and assign the license as a patent licensee, due to bankruptcy’s 
protections of a debtor’s interests and estate.  In Chapter 11 filings, 
the assumption and assignment of an executory contract fundamen-
tally affects the debtor’s ability to restructure.26  The debtor will want 
to assume the contracts it deems to be valuable and, upon assumption, 
retain the contracts as part of its reorganization.27  Since a patent li-
cense authorizes the debtor-licensee to operate under the terms of the 
license, the debtor-licensee will likely assume the license in order to 
continue its business operations during bankruptcy.  For example, a 
debtor may be in the business of manufacturing widgets and has li-
censed a patent enabling it to produce the widget.  After filing for 
bankruptcy, if the debtor wishes to be able to continue its business 
operations and (hopefully) make a profit, it must assume the patent 
license in order to continue manufacturing the widgets legally, or risk 
being sued for patent infringement by the patent owner. 
 
Property Bankruptcy Protection Act of 1988, which provides that licensees of “intellec-
tual property” (as defined in the Code) have the option to retain certain rights under 
the license even in the face of the debtor-licensor’s rejection.  Pub. L. No. 100-506, sec. 
1(b), § 365(n)(1), 102 Stat. 2538, 2538 (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. § 365(n)).  
For a discussion of section 365(n) and the impact of a license rejection by a debtor-
licensor, see SHARON K. SANDEEN, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY DESKBOOK FOR THE BUSI-
NESS LAWYER 179-81 (2d ed. 2009). 
24 11 U.S.C. § 365(g).  
25 For a discussion of the choices a licensor and licensee have when a license is 
rejected, see Livingston & Clark, supra note 17, at 191, 207.  
26 See 11 U.S.C. § 365(f) (restricting the ability to modify any “contract, lease, right 
or obligation” due to its assumption or assignment). 
27 See Peter S. Menell, Bankruptcy Treatment of Intellectual Property Assets:  An Economic 
Analysis, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 733, 737 (2007) (noting how the bankruptcy system 
“seeks to maximize the value of the remaining assets and capacities of the troubled ent-
ity” by “afford[ing] trustees and debtors substantial leeway to rescind contracts and 
reorder the affairs of the entity”); Madlyn Gleich Primoff & Erica G. Weinberger, E-
Commerce and Dot-com Bankruptcies:  Assumption, Assignment and Rejection of Executory Con-
tracts, Including Intellectual Property Greements [sic], and Related Issues Under Sections 365(c), 
365(e) and 365(n) of the Bankruptcy Code, 8 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 307, 314 (2000) 
(“[T]he purpose of section 365 of the Bankruptcy Code is to permit the trustee to re-
tain or assign valuable contracts and to abandon burdensome contracts . . . .”).  
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The specific requirements for assuming a contract are governed 
by section 365(b) of the Bankruptcy Code.  The main conditions are 
that the debtor must assure the court of its “ability to cure past de-
faults and meet future obligations.”28  These two conditions are in-
tended to ensure that the nondebtor party, who is forced to continue 
performance, receives the full benefit of its bargain.29  In the case of a 
patent license, because the licensor is foregoing its right to sue the li-
censee for conduct that “but for the license, would be an infringe-
ment,”30 the licensor must be assured that the debtor-licensee is in a 
position to fulfill the commercialization terms of the patent license.31 
When a debtor assumes a contract, the debtor’s estate becomes ob-
ligated to take on the contract in its entirety.32  The debtor cannot pick 
and choose parts of the contract it wishes to assume.33  Furthermore, 
upon assumption of the contract, the nondebtor party is given priority-
claimant status for both previous and future amounts due under the 
 
28 Primoff & Weinberger, supra note 27, at 311; see also 11 U.S.C. § 365(b) (identi-
fying the requirements that must be satisfied at the time of assumption). 
29 See S. REP. NO. 95-989, at 59 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5845 
(“If the trustee is to assume a contract . . . , the court will have to insure that the trus-
tee’s performance under the contract . . . gives the other contracting party the full 
benefit of his bargain.”)   
30 United States v. Studiengesellschaft Kohle, m.b.H., 670 F.2d 1122, 1127 (D.C. 
Cir. 1981); see also Tamietti, supra note 17, at 301 (quoting Studiengesellschaft Kohle in 
explaining how a patent license constitutes an executory contract). 
31 See Clinton H. Neagley, Patent Licensing for Small Agricultural Biotechnology Compa-
nies (discussing commercialization milestones in negotiating patent licenses), in 2 IN-
TELLECTUAL PROPERTY MANAGEMENT IN HEALTH AND AGRICULTURAL INNOVATION 
1213, 1213-19 (Krattiger et al. eds., 2007).  If the licensed invention is not practiced 
(i.e., through commercialization), the invention would be considered wasted.  See 
Note, Rights of the Owner of an Idle Patent in Equity, 20 HARV. L. REV. 638, 638-39 (1907).   
32 See Tex. N. W. Ry. Co. v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. (In re Chi. Rock 
Island & Pac. R.R. Co.), 860 F.2d 267, 272 (7th Cir. 1988) (noting that a “trustee can-
not accept the benefits of an executory contract without accepting the burdens as well” 
(quoting Schokbeton Indus., Inc. v. Schokbeton Prods. Corp., 466 F.2d 171, 175 (5th 
Cir. 1972))); Richmond Leasing Co. v. Capital Bank, N.A., 762 F.2d 1303, 1311 (5th 
Cir. 1985) (“[T]he often-repeated statement that the debtor must accept the contract 
as a whole means only that the debtor cannot choose to accept the benefits of the con-
tract and reject its burdens to the detriment of the other party of the agreement.”); 
Rockland Ctr. Assocs. v. TSW Stores of Nanuet, Inc. (In re TSW Stores of Nanuet, Inc.), 
34 B.R. 299, 304 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983) (holding that executory contracts cannot be 
accepted or rejected in part).  
33 See In re Storage Tech. Corp., 53 B.R. 471, 475-76 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1985) 
(“[T]he Bankruptcy Code requires assumption of an entire agreement.  Additionally, a 
debtor cannot avoid the effect of this rule by construing various parts of a transaction 
as separate agreements when they are clearly interdependent.” (citation omitted)).  
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contract.34  Thus, the debtor’s assumption of an executory contract ele-
vates the noncreditor party over the debtor’s other creditors.35 
3.  Assignment of an Executory Contract 
If the debtor assumes the contract but chooses not to retain it, 
then the debtor can elect to assign (i.e., transfer or sell) the contract.36  
Once the debtor has assumed the contract, it has the power to assign 
the contract to third parties.37  A debtor might assign the contract in 
order to raise capital through financing or cash to pay its creditors.  
For example, in In re Haven Eldercare, the debtor, an operator of several 
nursing, assisted living, and residential care facilities, petitioned for au-
thority to sell some of its facilities as part of its Chapter 11 reorganiza-
tion plan.38  As part of this sale, the debtor sought to assume and assign 
executory contracts and unexpired leases that were vital to the opera-
tion of these facilities.39  The bankruptcy court held that assumption 
and assignment of the executory contracts and unexpired leases were 
vital to the operation of the nursing facilities being sold and thus 
integral to the debtor’s restructuring proposal.40  As In re Haven Eldercare 
demonstrates, the assignment of the executory contract can play an es-
sential role in the debtor’s restructuring or reorganization.  The Bank-
ruptcy Code recognizes the importance of this power and provides that 
the debtor’s right to assign an executory contract overrides most non-
bankruptcy law and contractual restrictions on assignment.41 
 
34 See 11 U.S.C. § 365(b) (2006). 
35 In a bankruptcy proceeding, creditors are repaid based upon the priority of 
their claims.  Thus, the nondebtor party’s elevation in priority status is a significant by-
product of the debtor’s assumption of the executory contract.  See Michael T. Andrew, 
Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy:  Understanding “Rejection,” 59 U. COLO. L. REV. 845, 890 
(1988) (stating that when a debtor assumes a contract, “the non-debtor party departs 
the ranks of ordinary creditors and becomes a priority claimant both for past-due and 
later-accruing amounts”).  
36 Section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code states that “[t]he trustee, after notice and 
hearing, may use, sell, or lease, other than in the ordinary course of business, property 
of the estate.”  11 U.S.C. § 363(b).  Normally, when a nondebtor has an interest in the 
same property, section 363(e) permits the trustee to sell, lease, or use the property af-
ter notice and hearing, provided that the nondebtor’s interest is adequately protected.  
Id. § 363(e); see also id. § 361 (defining what constitutes “adequate protection” of an 
interest).   
37 Seeid. § 365(c), (f). 
38 390 B.R. 762, 765 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2008).  
39 Id. at 765-69.  
40 Id. at 772. 
41 This “free assignability” principle is set forth in section 365(f) of the Bankruptcy 
Code, which states, “Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c) of this section, not-
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To assist the debtor entity in maximizing its value under reorganiza-
tion or restructuring, many courts have interpreted the Code to allow 
the trustee or debtor-in-possession42 to assign most contracts regardless 
of contrary nonbankruptcy law or contractual provisions.43  For exam-
ple, in In re U.L. Radio Corp., the debtor was in the business of selling 
and servicing televisions and had entered into a lease with its landlord 
to rent a storefront for its operations.44  After the debtor filed for bank-
ruptcy, it tried to assume and assign (i.e., sell) its lease to a third party 
to operate the space as a small bistro.45  The bankruptcy court held that 
the lease could be assumed and assigned to the third party despite the 
“deviation in use . . . from an appliance store to a small bistro.”46 
In the context of patent licensing, because the bankruptcy estate is 
considered a separate legal entity than that of the debtor, an assump-
tion of the license is also an assignment of the license, regardless of 
whether the debtor-licensee actually assigns the license to a third par-
ty.47  When the debtor’s estate assumes the license, the estate also rece-
ives an assignment of the license.  This automatic assignment creates an 
issue for the patent licensor because the licensee is no longer the same 
 
withstanding a provision in an executory contract . . . of the debtor, or in applicable 
law, that prohibits, restricts, or conditions the assignment of such contract . . . , the 
trustee may assign such contract . . . under paragraph (2) of this subsection.”  11 
U.S.C. § 365(f). 
42 A trustee is an impartial person assigned by the court to oversee and administer 
the debtor’s bankruptcy process.  See id. §§ 701, 704 (describing the role of a trustee in 
Chapter 7 bankruptcy filings).  Most Chapter 11 bankruptcy cases, however, do not 
require appointment of a trustee.  Instead, the business becomes a debtor-in-
possession and continues to manage itself without an appointed trustee.  See id. § 1107 
(describing the rights and powers of a debtor-in-possession).  In this Comment, I will 
use the terms “trustee” and “debtor-in-possession” interchangeably, unless otherwise 
explicitly noted. 
43 Assignments are governed by section 365(f) of the Bankruptcy Code.  See id. 
§ 365(f).  Subsection (f)(1) “partially invalidates restrictions on assignment of con-
tracts or leases by the trustee to a third party.”  H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 349 (1978), 
reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6305; S. REP. NO. 95-989, at 59 (1978), reprinted in 
1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5845.  Subsection (f)(3) “invalidates contractual provisions 
that permit termination or modification in the event of an assignment, as contrary to 
the policy of this subsection.”  H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 349, reprinted in 1978 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6305; S. REP. NO. 95-989, at 59, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 
5845; see also 11 U.S.C. § 541(c) (codifying that despite a restriction on transfer or an 
ipso facto clause, “an interest of the debtor in property becomes property of the [deb-
tor’s] estate”).  
44 19 B.R. 537, 539 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982). 
45 Id. 
46 Id. at 544-45. 
47 This view is applied in what is known as the “hypothetical test.”  See infra subsec-
tion III.B.1. 
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legal entity as it was prebankruptcy.48  To better understand this issue, 
we must first examine the basic principles of patent law. 
II.  BASIC PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW 
A.  The Balance Between Exclusivity and Disclosure 
Though the power of free assignability is paramount to bankruptcy 
law, it runs directly counter to the policies of exclusive use and mono-
polistic control in patent law.  The Founding Fathers recognized the 
importance of strong patent rights by granting Congress the power “To 
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited 
Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive right to their respective 
Writings and Discoveries.”49  From this language, Congress developed 
exclusive-use policies in order to provide inventors and innovators with 
incentives to create.50  By rewarding inventors and innovators with a pe-
riod of exclusive use in exchange for disclosure of their creation, Con-
gress furthered the societal advancement of knowledge.51 
 
48 The Supreme Court has suggested that a debtor and its successor debtor-in-
possession should be treated as the same entity for purposes of applying the Bankrupt-
cy Code.  See NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 528 (1984) (“[I]t is sensible to 
view the debtor-in-possession as the same ‘entity’ which existed before the filing of the 
bankruptcy petition, but empowered by virtue of the Bankruptcy Code to deal with its 
contracts and property in a manner it could not have employed absent the bankruptcy 
filing.”).  Some courts, however, have read the Supreme Court’s comment as being “ne-
cessary only for the purposes of that case,” and have held that it “does not support in all 
cases the proposition that no assignment or transfer occurs as a matter of law between 
prepetition debtor and debtor in possession.”  Bonneville Power Admin. v. Mirant Corp. 
(In re Mirant), 440 F.3d 238, 254 n.21 (5th Cir. 2006).  Unfortunately, “neither the Su-
preme Court nor this Circuit has resolved the argument . . . that rights obtained in 
bankruptcy require that a debtor in possession be treated as a distinct legal entity from a 
prepetition debtor.”  Id.; see also infra notes 211-13 and accompanying text. 
49 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
50 The Patent Clause has been implemented through a series of acts that set out 
the conditions for obtaining a patent; these are now codified in Title 35 of the U.S. 
Code.  See Patent Act of 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 792; Patent Act of 1922, ch. 58, 42 Stat. 
389; Patent Act of 1836, ch. 357, 5 Stat. 117; Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 318; Pa-
tent Act of 1790, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109.  In particular, 35 U.S.C. § 154(a) (2006) describes a 
patentee’s exclusive rights to her invention. 
51 The word “patent” originates from the Latin patere, which means “to lay open” 
(for public inspection), and the term “letters patent,” which originally denoted royal 
decrees granting exclusive rights to certain individuals or businesses.  See Application 
of Bo Thuresson Af Ekenstam, 256 F.2d 321, 323 (C.C.P.A. 1958) (discussing the ori-
gin of the word “patent”).   
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The Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 
1984,52 more commonly known as the Hatch-Waxman Act, is a recent 
example of Congress’s attempts to balance the limited period of ex-
clusivity with invention disclosure.  The Hatch-Waxman Act was de-
signed to promote generic drug manufacturing while preserving a fi-
nancial incentive for the research and development conducted by 
pioneering drug companies (often brand-name pharmaceutical com-
panies).53  The Act allows generic drug companies to obtain marketing 
approval from the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) by sub-
mitting bio-equivalence studies of the drug compositions described in 
the pioneering drug company’s patent application.54  The Act also 
grants the pioneering drug company a period of additional marketing 
exclusivity of up to five years to compensate for the time the drug re-
mains under review for regulatory approval.55  Thus, in exchange for 
disclosing the drug, the pioneering drug company is rewarded with a 
period of market exclusivity.56 
A patent grants its owner the right to exclude others from practic-
ing its teachings (i.e., the invention).57  Through this exclusivity, pa-
tents create incentives for companies to engage in research and de-
velopment.58  Without the protection of patent rights, companies 
would not be willing to invest in research and development if third 
parties could simply copy their research and steal their profits.59  In 
 
52 Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585. 
53 See 130 CONG. REC. 23,764-65 (1984) (statement of Sen. Hatch).  
54 See Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, tit. I, 98 
Stat. at 1585-97 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 355 (2006)) (discussing abbre-
viated new drug applications).   
55 See id. at tit. II, 98 Stat. at 1598-1603 (codified as amended in scattered sections 
of 35 U.S.C.).  
56 See id. 
57 See, e.g., Herman v. Youngstown Car Mfg. Co., 191 F. 579, 584-85 (6th Cir. 1911) 
(“A patent is not the grant of a right to make or use or sell.  It does not, directly or in-
directly, imply any such right.  It grants only the right to exclude others.”). 
58 See Petra Moser, How Do Patent Laws Influence Innovation?  Evidence from Nineteenth-
Century World’s Fairs, 95 AM. ECON. REV. 1214, 1214-15 (2005) (arguing that innovation 
must respond to profit incentives in order for patent laws to influence innovation and 
referencing empirical studies that establish innovation’s responsiveness to incentives); 
Joseph A. DiMasi & Henry G. Grabowski, Patents and R&D Incentives:  Comments on the 
Hubbard and Love Trade Framework for Financing Pharmaceutical R&D 2 (June 25, 
2004), http://www.who.int/intellectualproperty/news/en/Submission3.pdf (question-
ing the ability of alternatives to patent protection to provide sufficient coverage of re-
search and development costs and thus the incentive to innovate).  
59 See, e.g., Howard T. Markey, Special Problems in Patent Cases, 66 F.R.D. 529, 532 
(1975) (noting that patents provide both “the incentive to risk the investment of the 
large sums and long years of effort required to bring the invention into the market-
YING_FINAL REVISED.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 3/17/2010  10:18 AM 
2010] The Plain Meaning of Section 365(c) 1237 
addition to large-scale funding, patent rights also enable small inven-
tors,60 in exchange for interests in the patent, to raise capital in order 
to bring inventions to market.61 
B.  Two Types of Patent Interests:  Assignments and Licenses 
An interest in a patent can be in the form of an assignment62 or a 
license.63  The distinction between a patent assignment and license is 
not merely one of word choice but of legal effect.64  A patent assign-
ment is a transfer of an ownership interest in the patent.65  As the Su-
preme Court stated in Waterman v. Mackenzie, there are three types of 
patent assignments: 
The patentee . . . may . . . assign, grant and convey, either, 1st, the whole 
patent, comprising the exclusive right to make, use and vend the inven-
tion throughout the United States; or, 2d, an undivided part or share of 
 
place at a reasonable price” and “the only deterrent to secrecy and the only market-
place for ideas we have”). 
60 Although most small or solo inventors qualify for “small-entity” status, and there-
fore are entitled to pay reduced patent fees, other types of nonprofit organizations also 
fall under this umbrella, including universities.  See 35 U.S.C. § 41(h)(1) (2006) (reduc-
ing fees by fifty percent for small businesses, independent inventors, and nonprofits); 13 
C.F.R. § 121.802(a) (2009) (providing that organizations with fewer than five hundred 
employees qualify for reduced patent fees).  Note that small-entity status is lost when the 
patent is licensed, exclusively or nonexclusively, or assigned to an organization that 
would not qualify for small-entity status.  37 C.F.R. § 1.27(a)(2)(i) (2009).  
61 See RICHARD STIM, PROFIT FROM YOUR IDEA:  HOW TO MAKE SMART LICENSING 
DECISIONS 4/10-4/12 (5th ed. 2006) (discussing “angel investors” who acquire equity 
in businesses rather than giving loans). 
62 As a matter of legal terminology, the term “assignment” has special meaning 
within both patent and bankruptcy law.  For purposes of this Comment, an “assign-
ment” is a bankruptcy assignment under section 365 of the Bankruptcy Code, and not 
a patent assignment of ownership of property.  See infra note 66 for an explanation of 
patent assignments. 
63 One can also take an interest in a patent in the form of a lien.  This occurs 
when the lienholder takes a security interest in the patent.  See U.C.C. § 9-102(42) 
(2005) (defining “general intangibles” to include intellectual property by including 
personal property and software in the definition); see also Scott J. Lebson, Security In-
terests in Intellectual Property in the United States, at pt. VIII (2006), http://www. 
ladas.com/IPProperty/ipprop_securityinterests.html (discussing how, historically, liens 
on patents have been perfected via U.S. Patent and Trademark Office filings).  
64 See Waterman v. Mackenzie, 138 U.S. 252, 256 (1891) (“Whether a transfer of a 
particular right or interest under a patent is an assignment or a license does not depend 
upon the name by which it calls itself, but upon the legal effect of its provisions.”).   
65 See 35 U.S.C. § 261 (defining patent ownership and assignment). 
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that exclusive right; or, 3d, the exclusive right under the patent within 
and throughout a specified part of the United States.
66
 
The Court noted, however, that “[a]ny assignment or transfer, 
short of one of these, is a mere license, giving the licensee no title in 
the patent, and no right to sue at law in his own name for an in-
fringement.”67  Thus, when a patent owner licenses its patent to a li-
censee, the patent owner is effectively granting the licensee a promise 
not to sue for patent infringement.68  The licensee has not gained 
“ownership” of the patent in any traditional sense of property,69 be-
cause a license does not equal an assignment.70  Simply put, a license is 
merely a covenant not to sue for infringement and not the transfer or 
conveyance of any property interest.71  Thus, the patent owner’s ability 
to choose and control which parties license its technology is tanta-
mount to exercising its right to exclude.72  Without a valid license, the 
 
66 138 U.S. at 255.  The term “assignment” has a particular meaning in patent law, 
implying formal transfer of title.  For example, if Inventor A assigns full rights of the 
patent to Company X, then Company X is the owner of the patent and has full rights, 
including the rights to enforce and license the patent.  See 35 U.S.C. § 261; Vaupel 
Textilmaschinen KG v. Meccanica Euro Italia S.P.A., 944 F.2d 870, 875 (Fed. Cir. 1991) 
(holding that in patent law, an assignment constitutes “a formal transfer of title”).  
67 Waterman, 138 U.S. at 255. 
68 See Spindelfabrik Suessen-Schurr Stahlecker & Grill GmbH v. Schubert & Salzer 
Maschinenfabrik Aktiengesellschaft, 829 F.2d 1075, 1081 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (“[A] patent 
license agreement is in essence nothing more than a promise by the licensor not to sue 
the licensee . . . [e]ven if [the promise is] couched in terms of ‘[l]icensee is given the 
right to make, use, or sell X . . . .’” (italics added) (citation omitted) (fourth alteration in 
original)); W. Elec. Co. v. Pacent Reproducer Corp., 42 F.2d 116, 118 (2d Cir. 1930) (“In 
its simplest form, a license means only leave to do a thing which the licensor would oth-
erwise have a right to prevent.  Such a license grants to the licensee merely a privilege 
that protects him from a claim of infringement by the owner of the patent monopoly.”). 
69 Patents are treated as personal property.  See 35 U.S.C. § 261 (“Subject to the 
provisions of this title, patents shall have the attributes of personal property.”).  
70 See Waterman, 138 U.S. at 255 (noting the differences between a patent assign-
ment and a patent license); Everex Sys., Inc. v. Cadtrak Corp. (In re CFLC, Inc.), 89 
F.3d 673, 679-80 (9th Cir. 1996) (concluding that nonexclusive patent licenses are 
considered to be personal rights that do not include any rights to assign or to subli-
cense unless expressly given by the licensor).  
71 See Tamietti, supra note 17, at 301 (“A license simply insulates those who pay for 
use of proprietary technology from the costs of infringement litigation, and does not 
transfer rights of ownership in the subject technology.” (footnote omitted)).  
72 See, e.g., Heaton-Peninsular Button-Fastener Co. v. Eureka Specialty Co., 77 F. 
288, 290-92 (6th Cir. 1896) (discussing the extent of a patent licensee’s interests and 
limitations).  
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practicing party has no authority to practice the patented invention 
and, therefore, is committing patent infringement.73 
C.  Exclusive Versus Nonexclusive Patent Licenses 
A patent owner can choose to grant the licensee an exclusive or 
nonexclusive license.  In an exclusive license, the patent holder prom-
ises that it will neither exploit the patent itself, nor permit any use of 
the patent other than by the licensee.74  A single patent can have mul-
tiple “exclusive licensees,” such that each licensee is granted exclusive 
rights to a portion of the overall patent rights.  Such exclusive rights 
are often divided temporally, geographically, by field of use, by type of 
use, or on a claim-by-claim basis.75  As a general rule, if an exclusive li-
censee wishes to bring forth an infringement suit, the patent holder 
must be joined, either voluntarily or involuntarily.76  The courts, how-
ever, have regarded this rule “as being prudential rather than consti-
tutional in nature,”77 and thus subject to an exception in the case 
when “all substantial rights” in the patent are transferred.78  Accor-
dingly, when all substantial rights in the patent have been transferred 
to the licensee, the licensee has effectively become an assignee of the 
patent, and therefore has legal title to the patent.79 
 
73 See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (“[W]hoever without authority makes, uses, offers to sell, 
or sells any patented invention . . . infringes the patent.”). 
74 See, e.g., MICHAEL A. EPSTEIN, EPSTEIN ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY § 18.02[B] 
(5th ed. Supp. 2009) (discussing limitations that may be placed on grants of intellec-
tual property licenses).  
75 See Int’l Gamco, Inc. v. Multimedia Games, Inc., 504 F.3d 1273, 1276-79 (Fed. 
Cir. 2007) (describing various types of exclusive patent licenses).  
76 See, e.g., Abbott Labs. v. Diamedix Corp., 47 F.3d 1128, 1131 (Fed. Cir. 1995) 
(“A licensee may obtain sufficient rights in the patent to be entitled to seek relief from 
infringement, but to do so, it ordinarily must join the patent owner.”). 
77 Prima Tek II, L.L.C. v. A-Roo Co., 222 F.3d 1372, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2000).  
78 Int’l Gamco, 504 F.3d at 1277-78. 
79 See Enzo APA & Son, Inc., v. Geapag A.G., 134 F.3d 1090, 1093 (Fed. Cir. 1998) 
(“[I]n certain limited circumstances, where all substantial rights under the patent have 
been transferred in the form of an exclusive license, . . . the licensee [is] the virtual 
assignee.”).  Courts have held that “an assignee is the patentee and has standing to 
bring suit for infringement in its own name.”  Id.; see also 35 U.S.C. § 100(d) (2006) 
(defining the term “patentee” as including “not only the patentee to whom the patent 
was issued but also the successors in title to the patentee”); 35 U.S.C. § 281 (providing 
that a “patentee” has a “remedy by civil action” for patent infringement); Arachnid, 
Inc. v. Merit Indus., Inc., 939 F.2d 1574, 1578-79 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (interpreting §§ 281 
and 100(d) to require that a party holding legal title to the patent bring an infringe-
ment suit to vindicate its rights). 
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On the other hand, a nonexclusive license is characterized by the 
patent holder promising only that it will not sue the licensee for in-
fringement, with no other promises regarding how it will exercise its 
monopoly power.80  The nonexclusive licensee “has no property inter-
est in the monopoly of the patent.”81  Furthermore, unlike an exclu-
sive licensee, the nonexclusive licensee does not have a contract with 
the patent owner that forbids others from practicing the invention.82  
“[T]he patent owner may freely license others, or may tolerate in-
fringers,” without violating any rights of the nonexclusive licensee.83  
Thus, a nonexclusive patent licensee only has the right to practice the 
patented invention and does not have the right to sue others for in-
fringing the patent.84 
D.  Patent Law’s Strong Protection of Owners’ Rights 
As the economic climate shifts from an industrial-based economy 
to a knowledge-based economy, strong protection of patent rights is 
used to ensure that knowledge is not exploited.85  For example, on the 
international level, in the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the United States entered into an in-
ternational agreement known as the Agreement on Trade Related As-
pects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) to establish standards for 
global patent regulation.86  Additionally, as discussed previously, the 
 
80 HAROLD EINHORN & THOMAS J. PARKER, 1 PATENT LICENSING TRANSACTIONS 
§ 1.01[2][c] (2007). 
81 W. Elec. Co. v. Pacent Reproducer Corp., 42 F.2d 116, 118 (2d Cir. 1930); see 
also id. at 118-19 (discussing the lack of a contract preventing others from practicing 
the invention). 
82 See id. at 118-19. 
83 Id. at 118. 
84 See id. (“[A] bare license to practice a patented invention gives the licensee no 
right to join as plaintiff in a suit against an infringer.”). 
85 For a discussion of the United States’ shift from an industrial-based economy to 
a knowledge-based economy and the use of intellectual property as a global currency, 
see Colleen Spring Zimmerman, Overview:  Intellectual Property—the New Global Currency, 
in 1 INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE GLOBAL MARKETPLACE 0.1-0.40 (Melvin Simensky 
et al. eds., 2d ed. 1999).  
86 See JOHN BRAITHWAITE & PETER DRAHOS, GLOBAL BUSINESS REGULATION 56-57, 
61-65 (2000) (tracing the evolution of international protections for intellectual prop-
erty and examining how the United States made maximizing intellectual property pri-
vileges the number-one priority of trade policy); William Hennessey, Patent Protection 
and Its Role in Promoting Invention, Innovation, and Technological Development 3-4, 
7-8 ( June 1, 1999), http://www.piercelaw.edu/assets/pdf/hennessey-patentprotection-
and-its-role-in-promoting.pdf (discussing the benefits of stronger patent-protection 
rights arising out of TRIPS). 
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Constitution provides that inventors and creators be rewarded with 
exclusive rights to their creations and discoveries.87 
In exchange for disclosing the invention, the patent owner is giv-
en the exclusive right to the invention.88  As part of this right, the pa-
tent owner has the choice of granting, to whomever it desires, a full 
assignment, an exclusive license, or a nonexclusive license for the pa-
tented invention.89  The type of license granted determines the licen-
see’s rights and scope of use of the patented invention.90   
In order to exercise her right to the fullest extent, the patent own-
er must have control over the identity of the patent licensee.91  This, 
however, becomes an issue when a Chapter 11 debtor-licensee wishes 
to assume the patent license during bankruptcy proceedings through 
the bankruptcy estate, which is considered a separate legal entity from 
the debtor.92  In bankruptcy, when the debtor’s estate assumes the li-
cense, the debtor-licensee effectively assigns the license to the estate.  
This automatic assignment, though beneficial to the debtor-licensee, is 
problematic for the patent licensor because the patent license is no 
longer held by the same legal entity as it was prebankruptcy.93  Fur-
thermore, even assuming that the patent license was still held by the 
same prepetition “entity,” the same right-to-control problems would 
arise once the debtor-licensee tried to sell the license to a third party as 
part of its restructuring or reorganization plan under Chapter 11. 
 
87 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
88 See discussion supra Section II.A.  
89 See Waterman v. Mackenzie, 138 U.S. 252, 255 (1891) (distinguishing between 
patent assignments and licenses).  
90 See, e.g., Tulip Computers Int’l B.V. v. Dell Computer Corp., 262 F. Supp. 2d 
358, 364-65 (D. Del. 2003) (holding that the language of the license agreement, which 
defined the scope of the license, could not be ignored).  
91 See Gardner v. Nike, Inc., 279 F.3d 774, 780-81 (9th Cir. 2002) (explaining the 
“strong policy reasons [for placing] the burden on the licensee to get the licensor’s 
explicit consent” before transferring a license to a third party); Rhone-Poulenc Agro, 
S.A. v. DeKalb Genetics Corp., 271 F.3d 1081, 1088 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (noting that 
“[a]llowing free assignability of patent licenses” would result in the patent holder los-
ing “the very important ability to control the identity of the licensees”), vacated on other 
grounds en banc, 284 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Everex Sys., Inc. v. Cadtrak Corp. (In re 
CFLC, Inc.), 89 F.3d 673, 679-80 (9th Cir. 1996) (relying on the policy concern that 
the patent holder have the ability to control the identity of licensees and holding that 
nonexclusive patent licenses are not assignable); cf. Harris v. Emus Records Corp., 734 
F.2d 1329, 1334 (9th Cir. 1984) (noting in the context of a copyright claim that the 
requirement that the licensee obtain explicit permission ensures that the licensor will 
be able to monitor the use of the property right).  
92 See 11 U.S.C. § 541(a) (2006). 
93 See also discussion supra note 48 (noting that the question of whether a legal 
transfer occurs between a debtor and its debtor-in-possession is still open). 
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III.  THE LEGAL SYSTEM’S APPROACH TO THE TENSION BETWEEN 
BANKRUPTCY AND PATENT LAW 
A.  Transferability of Patent Licenses and the Federal Common Law Principle 
As every law student has learned in Civil Procedure, the general 
rule, as stated in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, is that “[t]here is no 
federal general common law.”94  The courts have allowed federal 
common law, however, where a federal rule of decision is “necessary 
to protect uniquely federal interests.”95  In such cases, the creation of a 
federal rule should be “limited to situations where there is a ‘signifi-
cant conflict between some federal policy or interest and the use of 
state law.’”96  In the special case of patents and patent licensing, the 
courts have developed a federal common law principle to govern the 
transferability of patent-license rights.97  The default rule is that, unless 
the patent license expressly authorizes the transfer of the license, a 
patent licensee’s rights are personal and nontransferable.98 
 
94 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938). 
95 Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 640 (1981) (internal 
quotation marks omitted) (quoting Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 
398, 426 (1964)). 
96 O’Melveny & Myers v. FDIC, 512 U.S. 79, 87 (1994) (quoting Wallis v. Pan Am. 
Petroleum Corp., 384 U.S. 63, 68 (1966)). 
97 See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 150-51 (1989) 
(acknowledging that, to the extent state intellectual property regulation conflicts with 
federal regulation, it is preempted because national uniformity in the balance struck 
by patent protection is of the utmost importance); Rhone-Poulenc Agro, S.A. v. DeKalb 
Genetics Corp., 271 F.3d 1081, 1088-89 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (explaining the development 
and rationale of the federal common law principle governing patent licensing), vacated 
on other grounds en banc, 284 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2002).  Note, however, that scholars 
have debated whether a federal common law really exists.  See, e.g., Marie T. Reilly, The 
Federal Interest in the Transfer of Patent License Rights in Bankruptcy, 10 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 
3, 15-23 (2001) (arguing that the “personal” nature of patent licensing amounts to a 
state law contract issue and, therefore, cannot amount to a federal common law with 
respect to patent-license transferability). 
98 See Gilson v. Republic of Ireland, 787 F.2d 655, 658 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (“It is well 
settled that a non-exclusive licensee of a patent has only a personal and not a property 
interest in the patent and that this personal right cannot be assigned unless the patent 
owner authorizes the assignment or the license itself permits assignment.”).  Other 
forms of intellectual property, such as copyright, also follow the same default rule.  
Under copyright law, “a non-exclusive licensee . . . has only a personal and not a prop-
erty interest in the [intellectual property],” which “cannot be assigned unless the [in-
tellectual property] owner authorizes the assignment.”  In re Patient Educ. Media, Inc., 
210 B.R. 237, 242-43 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1997) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quot-
ing Gilson, 787 F.2d at 658); see also 3 MELVIN B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON 
COPYRIGHT § 10.02[A] (2009) (noting that the grant of a nonexclusive license is not a 
transfer of ownership). 
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The federal common law principle of patent nonassignability “has 
been the rule at least since 1852 when the Supreme Court decided 
Troy Iron & Nail v. Corning.”99  Even after the Supreme Court stated in 
Erie that there is no general federal common law, federal courts have 
continued to apply the default rule of patent nonassignability.100  As 
explained by the Seventh Circuit in Unarco Industries, Inc. v. Kelley Co., 
application of the rule is justified because patent law policy “is so dom-
inated by the sweep of federal statutes that legal relations which they 
affect must be deemed governed by federal law having its source in 
those statutes, rather than by local law.”101  In addition, the Ninth Cir-
cuit’s express acknowledgment that patents are a matter of federal 
policy justifies the application of federal law.102 
Many lower federal courts have agreed with the Seventh and 
Ninth Circuits’ rationales, recognizing that the federal common law 
prohibits a bankruptcy assignment of a patent license without the con-
sent of the licensor.103  Further, these courts have recognized that the 
federal common law preempts any state law or bankruptcy policy that 
would permit a bankruptcy assignment despite the licensor’s opposi-
tion.104  Thus, these courts consider the federal common law of nonas-
signability to be within the scope of “applicable law” under section 
365(c)(1)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code.105  Accordingly, the free trans-
 
99 PPG Indus., Inc. v. Guardian Indus. Corp., 597 F.2d 1090, 1093 (6th Cir. 1979).  
100 See, e.g., Everex Sys., Inc. v. Cadtrak Corp. (In re CFLC, Inc.), 89 F.3d 673, 679-
80 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that “[b]ecause federal law governs the assignability of 
nonexclusive patent licenses, and because federal law makes such licenses personal 
and assignable only with the consent of the licensor, [a] license is not assumable and 
assignable in bankruptcy under 11 U.S.C. § 365(c)”). 
101 465 F.2d 1303, 1306 (7th Cir. 1972) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quot-
ing Sola Elec. Co. v. Jefferson Co., 317 U.S. 173, 176 (1942)). 
102 See In re CFLC, 89 F.3d at 679 (noting that permitting states to provide for free 
assignability of nonexclusive patent licenses “would undermine the reward that encou-
rages invention because a party seeking to use the patented invention could either 
seek a license from the patent holder or seek an assignment of an existing patent li-
cense from a licensee” (emphasis omitted)). 
103 See, e.g., Murray v. Franke-Misal Techs. Group, LLC (In re Supernatural Foods, 
LLC), 268 B.R. 759, 802 (Bankr. M.D. La. 2001) (“The rule, simply stated, is that while 
ownership of patent rights is assignable, the rights granted under a non-exclusive li-
cense cannot inure to a third party, unless the licensor consents to such assignment.”). 
104 Id. 
105 See, e.g., In re CFLC, 89 F.3d at 680 (concluding that because the federal common 
law principle of nonassignability governs nonexclusive licenses, it is applicable under sec-
tion 365 of the Bankruptcy Code); In re Supernatural Foods, 268 B.R. at 796 (asserting that 
section 365(c)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code enforces the common law of nonassignability).  
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ferability principle codified in section 365(f) is subject to the limita-
tions of the federal common law of nonassignability.106 
Some state courts, however, have rejected the application of such 
a common law principle.107  Most notably, in Farmland Irrigation Co. v. 
Dopplmaier, Justice Traynor rejected the notion of a federal common 
law and held that state law should govern the assignment of patent li-
censes.108  Justice Traynor identified three bases for the decision:  
(1) because the nonassignability doctrine was decided before Erie, it 
did not address the issue of whether state or federal law should apply; 
(2) the fact patterns in earlier cases had license agreements based on 
the personal skills of the licensee; and (3) the federal common law 
rule undermined important state rules that favored free assignability.109 
Many commentators have adopted Justice Traynor’s reasoning, 
noting that neither the Seventh nor the Ninth Circuit ever truly ad-
dressed whether there was an underlying conflict between state and 
federal policy, or whether such a conflict would justify undermining 
state law.110  Others argue that under a proper economic approach, 
state law should prevail because it allows “the parties to maximize the 
value of the licenses to themselves and to society.”111  In addition, 
some commentators take the view that “federal courts appear to have 
overreached themselves in continuing to invent federal common law 
to forbid the assignment of a license agreement.”112 
 
106 See 11 U.S.C. § 365(c) (2006) (proscribing assignment when “applicable law” 
prevents parties other than the debtor from accepting or rendering performance on a 
contract); id. § 365(f) (allowing a trustee to assign a debtor’s contracts except as pro-
vided in subsection (c)).  
107 See, e.g., Superbrace, Inc. v. Tidwell, 21 Cal. Rptr. 3d 404, 414 (Ct. App. 2004) 
(“[W]e choose to stand steadfastly by our Supreme Court’s 1957 ruling in Dopplmaier 
that state law, not federal common law, is to be applied when determining whether a 
patent license is assignable.”). 
108 308 P.2d 732, 739 (Cal. 1957) (stating that there is “no policy underlying the 
federal patent statutes that requires a uniform federal rule of construction of license 
contracts to determine their assignability”).  
109 Id. at 738-40.  
110 See, e.g., Carole A. Quinn & R. Scott Weide, Violation of the Erie Doctrine:  Applica-
tion of a Rule of Federal Common Law to Issues of Patent License Transferability, 32 CREIGH-
TON L. REV. 1121, 1143-45 (1999) (providing hypothetical situations to which applica-
tion of federal law is unjustified).   
111 Daniel A. Wilson, Patent License Assignment:  Preemption, Gap Filling, and Default 
Rules, 77 B.U. L. REV. 895, 911 (1997). 
112 Aaron Xavier Fellmeth, Control Without Interest:  State Law of Assignment, Federal 
Preemption, and the Intellectual Property License, 6 VA. J.L. & TECH. 8, ¶ 81 (2001), 
http://vjolt.net/vol6/issue1/v6i1a08-Fellmeth.html.  
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B.  Inconsistent Case Law 
Despite the debate, one central factor emerges from these com-
peting approaches:  the patent holder’s consent to transferability.  
From a bankruptcy perspective, those opposed to the federal common 
law approach view nonexclusive patent licenses as undermining the 
fundamental principle of maximizing a debtor’s estate.113  Under this 
view, requiring a licensor’s explicit consent impedes the free transfe-
rability of the license, thereby undermining the heart of bankruptcy 
restructuring.114  From a patent perspective, however, a licensor’s con-
trol over its competitors is fundamental to a patent owner’s right to 
exclude.115  Thus, in order to prevent injury to the nondebtor party, a 
patent owner’s express authorization should be required before a 
debtor-licensee may assume and assign its patent license.116 
The question then becomes whether a nonexclusive licensee can 
continue to operate under its license once it files for bankruptcy.  Put 
another way, does the combination of bankruptcy and patent law re-
sult in a prohibition against assumption and assignment of patent li-
censes such that the debtor can no longer use the license?117  Because 
a nonexclusive patent license does not constitute a sale of the patent 
and no ownership rights are transferred, the debtor-licensee cannot 
sell its license agreement in order to pay its creditors in a bankruptcy 
proceeding.118  Ultimately, reconciling the conflict between patent 
 
113 See, e.g., Wilson, supra note 111, at 910-11 (arguing against federal patent policy 
preemption of state laws permitting assignment because such preemption prevents the 
maximization of license values). 
114 See id. (asserting that license assignment “allow[s] the parties to maximize the 
value of the licenses to themselves and to society”). 
115 See Concrete Washout Sys., Inc. v. Washout Sys., LLC, No. 08-2214, 2008 WL 
5411965, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 24, 2008) (“One of the fundamental and valuable as-
pects of a patent is the right to exclude others from using one’s invention.  In light of 
Plaintiff’s likelihood of success on the merits, its inability to control the use of its in-
vention will constitute irreparable injury.” (citation omitted)). 
116 See supra Sections II.B-D. 
117 See 11 U.S.C. § 365(c)(1) (2006) (prohibiting a trustee from assuming or as-
signing debtor contracts when applicable law excuses a party to the contract, other 
than the debtor, from accepting or rendering performance); id. § 365(f) (allowing 
assignments except when prohibited by subsection (c)).  
118 See In re Access Beyond Techs., Inc., 237 B.R. 32, 44 (Bankr. D. Del. 1999) 
(“Unless the [license] conveys some or all of the right to exclude others from practic-
ing the invention, it will not convey an interest in the patent, but is a mere license.”).  
An exclusive license will convey an interest in the patent, but a nonexclusive license is 
still a mere license and is treated as an executory contract subject to the rules of as-
sumption and assignment.  See id. at 44-45 (holding that the license at issue was non-
exclusive and was therefore an executory contract). 
YING_FINAL REVISED.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 3/17/2010  10:18 AM 
1246 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 158: 1225 
rights and bankruptcy principles requires determining whether the 
licensor must provide express consent to the transferability of the li-
cense in order for the debtor, as debtor-in-possession, to assume and 
assign the license to support its reorganization.119 
The case law, however, has not provided a clear answer.  In re All-
tech Plastics, Inc., decided in 1987, was the earliest bankruptcy court 
decision to hold that the federal common law principle of nonassig-
nability forecloses the transfer of a patent license.120  In Alltech, the 
debtor had acquired a nonexclusive license to manufacture plastic 
containers using a patented process.121  Upon filing for bankruptcy, 
the debtor sought to sell its interest to a third party, but the patent 
holder contended that under the federal common law such an as-
signment was prohibited without its express consent.122  The patent 
holder further asserted that the contract was nondelegable and that, 
therefore, section 365(c) of the Code applied and precluded the deb-
tor from assumption or assignment.123  By contrast, the intended third 
party transferee took the position that the court should apply the free 
transferability principle of section 365(f), which meant any antias-
signment clause in “applicable law” was unenforceable.124  The court 
ultimately held that, despite the provisions of section 365(f), the fed-
eral common law principle of patent nonassignability governed.125  
The court concluded that, 
although [a patent license’s] nonassignment is not statutorily mandated, 
the century old common law classification of patent licenses appears to 
place them within the realm of the types of contracts traditionally asso-
ciated with section 365(c).  As such . . . the Trustee in this instance does 
not have the power to assign the patent license absent consent from the 
licensor.
126
 
 
119 See Kuney, supra note 17, at 142 (defining this as the “critical issue” that emerges 
once a license is found to be an executory contract for purposes of section 365).  
120 71 B.R. 686, 690 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 1987) (“[N]otwithstanding subsection 
365(f), both [federal common] law and equity pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 365(c) ‘excuse’ 
the nondebtor party from accepting assignment . . . .”).  Although the debtor in Alltech 
filed for Chapter 7, the court’s rationale is relevant and applicable to both Chapter 7 
and 11 cases.  
121 Id. at 687. 
122 Id. 
123 Id. 
124 Id. at 687-88. 
125 See id. at 689 (noting that “[t]he rights of the patent owner to license the use of 
his invention is a creature of federal common law as is the right of the licensee to have 
the license construed”). 
126 Id. 
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After Alltech, this question of federal common law applicability in 
bankruptcy proceedings did not reach the circuit court level for ap-
proximately ten years.   
Finally in 1996, the Ninth Circuit addressed the issue in Everex Sys-
tems, Inc. v. Cadtrak Corp. (In re CFLC, Inc.).127  In In re CFLC, the debtor 
was in the business of manufacturing personal computers and had a 
nonexclusive license to use Cadtrak’s computer-graphics technology.128  
When the debtor sought to sell substantially all of its assets, Cadtrak ob-
jected to the sale on the basis that the patent license was not assignable 
under federal common law.129  The Ninth Circuit, while recognizing 
that “[t]here is no federal general common law,”130 was concerned that 
the “free assignability” notion of state law would undermine the mo-
nopoly rights fundamental to federal patent policy and hinder the crit-
ically important economic incentive that encourages innovation.131  
The court ultimately held that the federal common law principle of 
nonassignability applied, and the debtor was barred from assigning the 
license without Cadtrak’s consent.132 
Since Alltech and In re CFLC, two competing judicial approaches 
have developed at the circuit court level:  the “hypothetical” test and 
the “actual” test.  The hypothetical test, which requires the licensor’s 
explicit consent for assignment, has been adopted by four circuits—
the Third, Fourth, Ninth, and Eleventh—and is frequently applied in 
cases involving technology companies.133  Most bankruptcy courts, 
however, do not follow the hypothetical test.134  Instead, they, along 
 
127 89 F.3d 673 (9th Cir. 1996). 
128 Id. at 674-75. 
129 Id. at 675. 
130 Id. at 678 (alteration in original) (quoting Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 
64, 78 (1938)).  
131 See id. at 679 (“In essence, every licensee would become a potential competitor 
with the licensor-patent holder in the market for licenses under the patents.”). 
132 Id. at 679-80. 
133 See, e.g., RCI Tech. Corp. v. Sunterra Corp. (In re Sunterra Corp.), 361 F.3d 257, 
271 (4th Cir. 2004) (“Without [the patent holder’s] consent, [the debtor] was prec-
luded from assuming the agreement.”); Perlman v. Catapult Entm’t, Inc. (In re Cata-
pult Entm’t, Inc.), 165 F.3d 747, 750 (9th Cir. 1999) (“[W]e are bound by the plain 
terms of the statute and . . . adopt[] the ‘hypothetical test.’”); City of Jamestown, Tenn. 
v. James Cable Partners, L.P. (In re James Cable Partners, L.P.), 27 F.3d 534, 537 (11th 
Cir. 1994) (“The first condition [of 11 U.S.C. § 365(c)(1)] presents a hypothetical 
question . . . .”); In re W. Elecs. Inc., 852 F.2d 79, 83 (3d Cir. 1988) (holding that the 
language of section 356(c)(1) supports the use of the hypothetical test). 
134 See, e.g., United States v. TechDyn Sys. Corp. (In re TechDyn Sys. Corp.), 235 
B.R. 857, 861 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1999) (applying the hypothetical test but noting that 
“[the actual] test . . . has been adopted by a clear majority of the lower courts”). 
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with the First Circuit, have adopted the actual test, which does not re-
quire explicit consent.135 
1.  Development and Adoption of the Hypothetical Test 
The hypothetical test was first introduced in In re West Electronics 
Inc.136  West was not a patent-licensing case; instead, the case involved 
an executory contract for missile-launcher power-supply units between 
a defense contractor and the United States.137  West, the supplier, suf-
fered from operational problems, late deliveries, and irregularities in 
its accounting procedures.138  Upon investigation, the United States 
sought to terminate the contract prior to West’s bankruptcy filing, a 
fact suggesting that there was a material problem with West’s ability to 
perform.139  When West filed its bankruptcy petition and received an 
automatic stay, the government sought an order to lift the stay so it 
could terminate the contract agreement.140  West contended that “it 
had the capacity and intention to cure the default” and should be giv-
en the opportunity to perform.141  Both the bankruptcy court and the 
district court on review denied the government’s motion, finding that 
the agreement constituted an executory contract.142 
The issue facing the Third Circuit was whether the debtor could 
assume the executory contract even if it had no intention of assigning 
it to a third party.143  The court answered in the negative.144  The ten-
sion was between 41 U.S.C. § 15, which prevents transfers of govern-
ment contracts to third parties, and section 365(f) of the Bankruptcy 
Code, which provides that executory contracts are generally freely 
transferable.145  The Third Circuit reversed the lower courts, holding 
that the government contract could not be assumed because “West 
could not force the government to accept the ‘personal attention and 
 
135 See Institut Pasteur v. Cambridge Biotech Corp., 104 F.3d 489, 493 (1st Cir. 1997) 
(declining to follow the hypothetical test); Summit Inv. & Dev. Corp. v. Leroux, 69 F.3d 
608, 612 (1st Cir. 1995) (same). 
136 852 F.2d at 83. 
137 Id. at 80. 
138 Id. 
139 Id. 
140 Id. at 80-81. 
141 Id. 
142 Id. at 81. 
143 Id. at 82-83.   
144 Id. 
145 Id. 
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services’ of a third party without [the government’s] consent.”146  West 
was barred from assuming and assigning the contract.147  In reaching 
its conclusion, the court examined the plain meaning of the statute 
and stated that 
11 U.S.C. § 365(c)(1) creates a hypothetical test—i.e., under the appli-
cable law, could the government refuse performance from “an entity oth-
er than the debtor or the debtor in possession.” . . . [T]he relevant in-
quiry is not whether 41 U.S.C. § 15 would preclude an assignment from 
West as a debtor to West as a debtor in possession, but whether it would 
foreclose an assignment by West to another defense contractor.
148
 
Although West did not involve a patent license, it developed the hypo-
thetical test that was later used by the Eleventh Circuit in a case relat-
ing to a franchise agreement.149  It was not until 1999 that the hypo-
thetical test was applied in the context of patent licensing. 
In In re Catapult Entertainment, Inc., the Ninth Circuit expressly 
adopted the hypothetical test, holding that the “applicable law,” as re-
lating to section 365(c)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code, was the federal 
common law principle of patent nonassignability.150  Catapult Enter-
tainment was in the business of creating an online gaming network for 
16-bit console videogames.151  Catapult also entered into two nonex-
clusive license agreements with Stephen Perlman for the use of his pa-
tents and patent applications.152  When Catapult filed for reorganiza-
tion under Chapter 11, it proposed a reorganization plan involving a 
reverse triangular merger with two other companies in which Catapult 
would emerge as the surviving corporation.153  The reorganization 
plan also proposed that after the merger, Catapult would assume the 
patent licenses in order to continue operations.154  Catapult’s creditors 
and equity holders voted in favor of the reorganization plan and the 
 
146 Id. at 83. 
147 Id. 
148 Id.  The court also held that, based upon the literal meaning of the statute and 
Congress’s intent, West as a debtor and West as a debtor-in-possession were “materially 
distinct entities.”  Id. 
149 City of Jamestown, Tenn. v. James Cable Partners, L.P. (In re James Cable Part-
ners, L.P.), 27 F.3d 534, 537 & n.6 (11th Cir. 1994). 
150 Perlman v. Catapult Entm’t, Inc. (In re Catapult Entm’t, Inc.), 165 F.3d 747, 
750 (9th Cir. 1999). 
151 Id. at 748. 
152 Id.  
153 Id. at 748-49. 
154 Id. at 749. 
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bankruptcy court confirmed it.155  Perlman, however, objected to the 
plan and appealed.156 
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed the confirmation of Cata-
pult’s reorganization plan.157  In doing so, the Ninth Circuit became 
the first circuit court to hold that a nonexclusive patent license could 
not be assumed in a bankruptcy proceeding without the consent of 
the licensor.158  Similar to West, the issue facing the Ninth Circuit was 
whether Catapult, as the debtor-in-possession, could assume the Perl-
man licenses without Perlman’s consent.159  The court, noting the ten-
sion between the hypothetical and actual test, adopted and explained 
the hypothetical test: 
The literal language of § 365(c)(1) is thus said to establish a “hypotheti-
cal test”:  a debtor in possession may not assume an executory contract 
over the nondebtor’s objection if applicable law would bar assignment to 
a hypothetical third party, even where the debtor in possession has no 
intention of assigning the contract in question to any such third party.
160
 
Under the hypothetical test, the court ruled that Catapult could not 
assume the Perlman licenses if “(A) federal patent law excuses Perl-
man from accepting performance from or rendering performance to 
an entity other than Catapult . . . ; and (B) Perlman does not consent 
to such assumption.”161  Thus, if a debtor cannot assume a license, this 
is equivalent to a rejection and the license effectively terminates as a 
matter of law upon bankruptcy, unless the licensor agrees otherwise.162 
Most recently, the Fourth Circuit adopted the hypothetical test in 
RCI Technology Corp. v. Sunterra Corp. (In re Sunterra Corp.).163  There, 
Sunterra, the debtor, had entered into a software license agreement 
with RCI in which RCI granted Sunterra a nonexclusive license for the 
 
155 Id. 
156 Id.  
157 Id. at 748.  
158 See id. at 754-55 (holding that “where applicable nonbankruptcy law makes an 
executory contract nonassignable because the identity of the nondebtor party is ma-
terial, a debtor in possession may not assume the contract absent consent of the non-
debtor party”). 
159 Id. at 749.  Although Perlman also contended that section 365(c)(1) prohibited 
the assignment of its licenses to the third parties involved in the reverse triangular mer-
ger, the court did not reach the issue of assignment because it barred Catapult from 
even assuming the Perlman licenses.  Id. at 749 n.1.   
160 Id. at 750.  
161 Id. at 750-51 (italics omitted). 
162 See id.  
163 361 F.3d 257 (4th Cir. 2004).  
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use of its software.164  Sunterra filed for bankruptcy and, prior to the 
court’s approval of the reorganization plan, RCI filed a motion to have 
the software license deemed rejected.  RCI asserted that the license was 
an executory contract and that Sunterra, as debtor-in-possession, was 
precluded by section 365(c) from assuming the license without RCI’s 
consent.165  RCI further contended that because it had not given Sun-
terra permission to assume the license, the court was required, as a 
matter of law, to deem the license rejected.166  The bankruptcy court, 
adopting the actual test,167 held that section 365(c) did not prohibit 
Sunterra, as debtor-in-possession, from assuming the license because 
Sunterra never intended to assign the license to a third party.168  Under 
this interpretation, “Sunterra, as debtor in possession, was entitled to 
assume the [license] because it did not intend to assign, and RCI 
would not actually be forced to accept performance from a party other 
than Sunterra.”169  On review, the district court affirmed the bankrupt-
cy court, ruling that because RCI would not be asked to accept per-
formance from a party other than Sunterra, Sunterra was not prec-
luded from assuming the patent license under section 365(c).170 
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit rejected the lower courts’ adoption 
of the actual test and adopted the hypothetical test.171  The court, in re-
jecting the actual test, refused to interpret the “or” in the statutory 
phrase “assume or assign” as a conjunctive “and.”172  In addition, the 
court held that federal copyright law was the “applicable nonbankrupt-
cy law,” and thus Sunterra was precluded from assuming the nonexclu-
sive license because the federal common law prohibited assignment.173 
 
164 Id. at 260.  Although In re Sunterra dealt with software licensing rather than pa-
tent licensing, the same federal principle of common law patent nonassignability ap-
plies to copyright law, because copyrights—like patents—are a form of intellectual 
property governed by federal statute.  See Menell, supra note 27, at 800-02 (discussing 
bankruptcy’s treatment of copyright licenses and the relationship between copyright 
and patent law); supra note 98 and accompanying text. 
165 In re Sunterra Corp., 361 F.3d at 261. 
166 Id.  
167 The bankruptcy court adopted the actual test, see infra subsection III.B.2, which 
reads the disjunctive “or” in section 365(c) as a conjunctive “and.”  Id. at 263.   
168 Id. at 262-63.   
169 Id. at 263. 
170 Id.  
171 Id. at 267. 
172 Id. 
173 See id. at 262 n.7, 271. 
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2.  Development and Adoption of the Actual Test 
Although several circuits have adopted the hypothetical test, most 
bankruptcy courts, as well as the First Circuit, have expressly rejected 
it in favor of the actual test.174  Under the actual test, section 365(c) is 
read in reference to the “actual” intent of the debtor with respect to 
assigning the license.175  If the debtor has no intent to assign the li-
cense, then section 365(c) does not prevent assumption of the li-
cense.176  Under the actual test, the debtor does not need the licen-
sor’s consent in order to assume the license.177 
The actual test was first developed by the First Circuit in Summit 
Investment & Development Corp. v. Leroux.178  In Leroux, the court looked 
to the legislative history of the Bankruptcy Code and concluded that 
Congress intended section 365(c) to provide the nondebtor party with 
the benefit of its bargain.179  Relying on the 1984 Amendments to the 
Bankruptcy Code, the court noted that the change in statutory lan-
guage from “debtor” to “the debtor or the debtor in possession” indi-
cated Congress’s intent that the prohibition on assumption does not 
apply when the debtor-in-possession is the party who will be perform-
ing the debtor’s duties and accepting performance from the nondeb-
tor party.180  The court noted that this type of analysis results in a 
“case-by-case inquiry into the actual consequences . . . to the nondeb-
tor party,” instead of the abstract rule of the hypothetical test.181  The 
court further stated that in order to prevent assumption of the con-
tract, the nondebtor party “must make an individualized showing that 
it would not receive the ‘full benefit of [its] bargain’ were an entity to 
be substituted for the debtor from whom performance is due.”182 
Although Leroux was not a patent-licensing case, it was not long 
before the First Circuit applied the actual test in the context of patent 
 
174 See Summit Inv. & Dev. Corp. v. Leroux, 69 F.3d 608, 612-14 (1st Cir. 1995) 
(developing the actual test); see also Institut Pasteur v. Cambridge Biotech Corp., 104 
F.3d 489, 493 (1st Cir. 1997) (applying the actual test); cf. United States v. TechDyn 
Sys. Corp. (In re TechDyn Sys. Corp), 235 B.R. 857, 860-61 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1999) 
(adopting the hypothetical test but noting that “[the actual] test . . . has been adopted 
by a clear majority of lower courts”).  
175 Leroux, 69 F.3d at 612. 
176 Id. 
177 See id.  
178 See id. at 612-14. 
179 Id. at 612-13. 
180 Id. at 613 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 96-1195, at 12 (1980)). 
181 Id.   
182 Id. (alteration in original). 
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rights.  In Institut Pasteur v. Cambridge Biotech Corp., Cambridge Biotech 
Corporation (CBC) entered into a mutual cross-license agreement 
with Institut Pasteur.183  In the agreement, CBC was authorized to util-
ize Pasteur’s HIV diagnostic procedures in any diagnostic kits CBC 
sold in the United States and other countries.184  When CBC filed for 
Chapter 11, its reorganization plan proposed that it assume the li-
cense and continue to operate its diagnostics division using Pasteur’s 
patented procedures.185  CBC’s reorganization plan also called for the 
sale of CBC’s stock to a subsidiary of bioMerieux, one of Pasteur’s di-
rect competitors.186  Naturally, Pasteur objected to CBC’s reorganiza-
tion plan, contending that the proposed sale of CBC’s stock to bioMe-
rieux amounted to CBC’s assumption of the cross-licenses and their 
de facto assignment to a third party (here, bioMerieux).187  Of particu-
lar note, Pasteur’s licensing director “attested that Pasteur would not 
have granted its competitor, bioMerieux, or a subsidiary, a patent li-
cense under the terms allowed CBC.”188 
Although it conceded that Pasteur’s position was understandable, 
the First Circuit, following its precedent in Leroux, rejected the hypo-
thetical test and instead ruled that there needed to be a case-by-case 
inquiry into whether the nondebtor party (i.e., Pasteur) was actually 
being forced to accept performance from someone (i.e., bioMerieux) 
other than the party with whom it had originally contracted (i.e., 
CBC).189  In this context, the First Circuit held that “the bankruptcy 
court cannot simply presume as a matter of law that the debtor-in-
possession is a legal entity materially distinct from the prepetition deb-
tor with whom the nondebtor party . . . contracted.”190  Rather, the fo-
cus should be “on the performance actually to be rendered by the deb-
tor-in-possession,” and whether Pasteur would be denied the full 
benefit of its bargain.191 
Surprisingly, the First Circuit also permitted CBC’s stock sale to 
bioMerieux.192  In fact, the court held that the stock sale did not result 
 
183 104 F.3d 489 (1st Cir. 1997).  
184 Id. at 490. 
185 Id.  
186 Id.  
187 Id. at 490-91. 
188 Id. at 491.  
189 Id. at 493. 
190 Id.  
191 Id. (citing S. REP. NO. 95-989, at 59 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 
5845).  
192 Id. at 494-95.  
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in a “different entity” than that with which Pasteur had originally con-
tracted, even though CBC was technically now owned by bioMerieux.193  
Instead, the court held that because the cross-licenses contained no 
provision either limiting or terminating CBC’s rights if its stock 
changed hands, there was no change in beneficial ownership in Pas-
teur’s license agreement.  Under this interpretation, Pasteur could not 
restrict the license.194 
The Fifth Circuit, in Bonneville Power Administration v. Mirant Corp. 
(In re Mirant Corp.), also adopted the actual test but provided a differ-
ent justification than the First Circuit.195  Mirant, an electrical power 
producer and seller, entered into a contract with Bonneville Power 
Administration (BPA), a federal power-marketing agency within the 
United States Department of Energy.196  When Mirant filed for bank-
ruptcy, BPA sought to terminate the contract for future power pur-
chases, asserting the right to do so under an ipso facto default provi-
sion that authorized BPA to terminate the contract upon Mirant’s 
bankruptcy filing.197  Mirant and BPA agreed that ipso facto clauses 
were generally invalid under section 365(e).198  However, they dis-
puted whether ipso facto default provisions remained enforceable 
under section 365(c) if the contract excused the nondebtor party 
from accepting performance from a trustee or assignee.199 
Although Mirant was not about a patent license, the court noted 
that the dispute involved essentially the same issue the apparent con-
flict between subsections 365(c) and 365(f) raises—namely whether a 
prohibition on assignment applies in cases where no assignment is ac-
tually sought.200  The Fifth Circuit held that the “plain text” of section 
365(e)(2) requires the use of the actual test because the prohibition 
 
193 See id.  
194 Id.  
195 440 F.3d 238 (5th Cir. 2006). 
196 Id. at 241.  
197 Id. at 242-43.  Termination upon bankruptcy provisions are often known as ipso 
facto clauses (the Latin phrase meaning “by the fact itself”) because the language pro-
vides that the fact of bankruptcy itself is enough to trigger the termination of the 
agreement.  Generally, ipso facto clauses are unenforceable in bankruptcy under sec-
tions 541(c) and 365(e)(1).  See THOMAS H. JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF BANK-
RUPTCY LAW 40-43 (1986) ( justifying bankruptcy law’s disregard of ipso facto clauses); 
Yeon-Koo Che & Alan Schwartz, Section 365, Mandatory Bankruptcy Rules and Inefficient 
Continuance, 15 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 441, 441-46 (1999) (discussing ipso facto clauses 
under section 365(e)).  
198 440 F.3d at 245. 
199 Id. at 245-46.  
200 Id. at 246. 
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on assignment is “tethered . . . to ‘applicable’ law” and the “applicable 
law must apply to a set of circumstances.”201  The court held that “[t]he ap-
plicability of the law under § 365(e)(2)(A) is determined not in the ab-
stract but on the record at hand.”202  Furthermore, the court criticized 
the hypothetical test as being too abstract and complained that it could 
force courts to decide whether an assignment would be permitted, even 
given circumstances not actually before the court.203  The Fifth Circuit 
was likely concerned with the prospect of rendering an advisory opinion 
were it forced to rule on an assignment under a host of fact patterns not 
actually presented. 
C.  Recent Case Law Trends in Interpretation 
Although the hypothetical test is currently favored, since In re Cat-
apult and Pasteur were decided there has been a trend toward a “plain 
meaning” interpretation of section 365(c).  The leading case in this 
line of reasoning is In re Footstar, Inc.204  Footstar, the debtor, had en-
tered into a series of agreements with Kmart that provided for Kmart 
to operate a separate “Shoemart Corporation” owned 51% by Footstar 
and 49% by Kmart.205  The agreements also gave Shoemart Corpora-
tion the exclusive right to operate footwear departments in particular 
Kmart stores.206  In addition, the agreements expressly prohibited as-
signment of the contract.207  Thus, when Footstar filed for bankruptcy 
and sought to assume the agreements, Kmart asserted that assumption 
was prohibited.208 
In Footstar, Judge Hardin addressed the conflict between the ac-
tual and hypothetical tests and ultimately concluded that the actual 
test is more appropriate.209  In his analysis, however, Judge Hardin 
held that neither the hypothetical nor the actual test applied.  Instead, 
he focused on the “plain meaning” of the statute “to reach a conclu-
sion which is entirely harmonious with both the objective sought to be 
obtained in Section 365(c)(1) and the overall objectives of the Bank-
 
201 Id. at 249-50 (emphasis added). 
202 Id. at 250.  
203 See id.  
204 323 B.R. 566 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2005).  
205 Id. at 568. 
206 Id.  
207 Id. at 569 n.1.  
208 Id. at 567. 
209 Id. at 570-71.  
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ruptcy Code, without construing ‘or’ to mean ‘and.’”210  In particular, 
he held that the previous decisions were fundamentally flawed be-
cause they were based on the premise that the term “trustee” was syn-
onymous with “debtor” or “debtor in possession.”211  He continued by 
stating that neither the Bankruptcy Code nor its legislative history 
equates a “trustee” with a “debtor” or “debtor in possession.”212  As a 
result, when the Code refers to both a “trustee” and a “debtor” or 
“debtor in possession,” the two terms must have different meanings.213  
Accordingly, section 365(c) need not restrict assumption of the con-
tract by the debtor-in-possession because it only refers to limitations 
on the trustee’s ability to assume or assign the contract.214  Under this 
interpretation, the rights of the nondebtor party remain protected 
because the nondebtor party may decline performance from a party 
other than the debtor-in-possession.215  Furthermore, the debtor party 
is protected by avoiding “the perverse and anomalous consequence of 
the ‘hypothetical test’ rule under which a debtor may lose the benefit 
of a non-assignable contract vital to its economic future solely because 
it filed for bankruptcy.”216 
Bankruptcy courts have recently adopted the rationale set forth in 
Footstar.217  In In re Adelphia Communications Corp., Judge Gerber re-
jected the hypothetical test, concluding that the “the right to object to 
assignment does not by itself affect the right to assume.”218  Further-
more, he held that no purpose was served by disqualifying a debtor-in-
possession from assuming an executory contract because “[w]hen a 
debtor in possession, as contrasted to a trustee, wishes to assume, the 
 
210 Id. at 570. 
211 See id. at 570-71 (“To construe ‘trustee’ in Section 365(c)(1) to mean ‘debtors’ 
or ‘debtors in possession’ would defy the ‘plain meaning’ of the statute as written by 
Congress and could be characterized as the same sort of judicial legislation as Kmart 
condemns in the cases that apply the ‘actual test’ to construe ‘or’ as ‘and.’”).  
212 Id. at 571. 
213 Id.; see also 11 U.S.C. § 365(c)(1), (e)(1)–(2), (f) (2006) (identifying distinct roles 
for debtors and trustees). 
214 See In re Footstar, 323 B.R. at 573-74 (“The basic objective of Section 365(c)(1)—
to protect the contract counterparty from unlawful assignment of the contract—simply 
is not implicated when a debtor in possession itself seeks to assume, but not assign, the 
contract.”). 
215 Id. at 573. 
216 Id. at 574.  
217 See, e.g., In re Adelphia Commc’ns Corp., 359 B.R. 65, 72 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007) 
(distinguishing between the assumption of a contract and the assignment of a contract).  
218 Id.  
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underlying needs and concerns to be protected have nothing to do 
with each other.”219 
The Bankruptcy Court for the District of New Mexico recently ap-
plied the Footstar analysis in a patent-licensing case.220  Aerobox, the 
debtor, entered into a nonexclusive license for the use of Tubus Bauer’s 
patent rights and confidential information in manufacturing thermop-
lastic sandwich panels.221  The license agreement contained an ipso fac-
to clause terminating the agreement if Aerobox became insolvent or 
went into bankruptcy.222  Upon Aerobox’s bankruptcy filing, Tubus 
Bauer filed a motion seeking rejection of the license, asserting that the 
license could not be assumed or assigned under the hypothetical test.223 
The court, accepting the logic of Footstar, agreed that it “makes no 
sense to read ‘trustee’ to mean ‘debtor in possession’” because 
“[d]oing so would ‘render the provision a virtual oxymoron.’”224  It al-
so held that the limitations of section 365(c)(1) are directed at pro-
tecting the nondebtor party from being forced to accept performance 
from an entity other than the party with whom it originally con-
tracted.225  Furthermore, the court agreed with the Institut Pasteur v. 
Cambridge Biotech Corp.226 decision that a debtor-in-possession “is not 
materially distinct from the pre-bankruptcy entity that is a party to the 
[license].”227  On these grounds, the court denied Tubus Bauer’s mo-
tion to compel rejection.228 
Interestingly, the court acknowledged the license agreement’s 
provision requiring the licensor “not to unreasonably withhold its 
consent to assignment.”229  Although the creditors’ committee argued 
that this provision was less restrictive than the general federal com-
mon law and constituted either a form of “preconsent” to assumption 
or an indication that the licensor had “opted out of generally applica-
ble law,” the court ultimately declined to address this point.230 
 
219 Id. at 72 n.18. 
220 In re Aerobox Composite Structures, LLC, 373 B.R. 135 (Bankr. D.N.M. 2007).  
221 Id. at 137.  
222 Id. at 138.  
223 Id. 
224 Id. at 142 (quoting In re Footstar, Inc., 323 B.R. 566, 573 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2005)).  
225 Id. at 141. 
226 104 F.3d 489 (1st Cir. 1997). 
227 In re Aerobox, 373 B.R. at 141.  
228 Id. at 142. 
229 Id.; see also id. at 137 n.1 (providing the relevant provision of the license agree-
ment). 
230 Id. at 142. 
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Despite In re Adelphia and In re Aerobox, not all bankruptcy courts 
have followed Footstar.  Most notably, the Bankruptcy Court for the 
Western District of Pennsylvania rejected the Footstar analysis in Federal 
Insurance Co. v. Continental Casualty Co.231  Here, the court, noting that 
the Western District of Pennsylvania’s bankruptcy courts have always 
employed a broad interpretation of In re West Electronics,232 concluded 
that the debtor-in-possession was “a distinct entity from the prepeti-
tion debtor.”233  The court, however, also went on to discuss the uncer-
tainty surrounding the treatment of the debtor and the debtor-in-
possession as distinct legal entities.234 
IV.  INTERPRETING SECTION 365(C):  IS THE “OR” REALLY AN “AND”? 
A.  The “or” as a Disjunctive “or” 
The plain-meaning rule of statutory interpretation requires that 
when the statutory language “is plain and admits of no more than one 
meaning,” the court should not try to “interpret” the statute.235  The 
language of section 365(c) reads, in part, that “[t]he trustee may not 
assume or assign any executory contract . . . of the debtor.”236  Al-
though the statute clearly says “assume or assign,” the dispute between 
the hypothetical and actual tests centers on whether the “or” in the 
phrase should be read as a disjunctive “or” or as a conjunctive “and.”237 
Proponents of the hypothetical test argue that the test is premised 
on a literal interpretation of the statute—namely, reading the “or” as a 
disjunctive “or.”238  Reading the “or” literally, section 365(c) states that 
 
231 No. 05-0305, 2006 WL 3386625 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. Nov. 22, 2006). 
232 852 F.2d 79 (3d Cir. 1988).  
233 Cont’l Cas., 2006 WL 3386625, at *15.  
234 Id.; see also Biltmore Assoc., L.L.C. v. Twin City Fire Ins. Co., No. 05-4220, 2006 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56034, at *13 n.4 (Bankr. D. Ariz. July 21, 2006) (“The distinction be-
tween a debtor and a debtor in possession is nuanced and unclear, and has yielded va-
rying results in district courts, among the circuits, and within the Ninth Circuit.”).  But 
see 11 U.S.C. § 541(a) (2006) (recognizing that upon filing for bankruptcy, an estate is 
created with a different legal character than that of the prepetition debtor).   
235 Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917); see also Hillman v. IRS, 
263 F.3d 338, 342 (4th Cir. 2001) (“[U]nless there is some ambiguity in the language 
of a statute, a court’s analysis must end with the statute’s plain language . . . .”).   
236 11 U.S.C. § 365(c) (emphasis added).  
237 See RCI Tech. Corp. v. Sunterra Corp. (In re Sunterra Corp.), 361 F.3d 257, 262 
nn.8-9 (4th Cir. 2004) (explaining the difference between the hypothetical and actual 
tests).  
238 See id. at 262 n.8 (stating that the test construes the “or” “to mean what it says”); 
City of Jamestown, Tenn. v. James Cable Partners, L.P. (In re James Cable Partners, 
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the bankruptcy trustee or debtor-in-possession239 can neither assume 
nor assign an executory contract if “applicable law excuses a party, 
other than the debtor, . . . from accepting performance from or ren-
dering performance to an entity other than the debtor or the debtor 
in possession . . . [and] such party does not consent to such assump-
tion or assignment.”240  Therefore, under this interpretation, the act of 
assuming an executory contract is an event separate and distinct from as-
signing the executory contract.  It follows that the conditions of section 
365(c)(1) must apply equally to both the assumption and assignment 
prongs.241  Accordingly, a debtor must reject the contract if applicable 
law forbids the debtor from assuming or assigning the contract.242 
Applying the conditions of section 365(c)(1) to the assumption 
prong of section 365(c), the statute would read, “The trustee may not 
assume . . . any executory contract or unexpired lease of the debtor . . . 
if applicable law excuses a party . . . from accepting performance from 
or rendering performance to an entity other than the debtor or the 
debtor in possession.”243 
In the context of patent licensing, the applicable law is the federal 
common law principle of patent nonassignability, which forbids the 
debtor from transferring the license without the licensor’s explicit 
 
L.P.), 27 F.3d 534, 537 (11th Cir. 1994) (interpreting the statute as requiring the court 
to answer a “hypothetical question”); In re W. Elecs. Inc., 852 F.2d 79, 83 (3d Cir. 1988) 
(“11 U.S.C. § 361(c)(1) creates a hypothetical test—i.e., under the applicable law, 
could the government refuse performance from an entity other than the debtor or the 
debtor in possession.”); In re Access Beyond Techs., Inc., 237 B.R. 32, 48-49 (Bankr. D. 
Del. 1999) (following the Third Circuit’s adoption of the hypothetical test).  Critics of 
the hypothetical test/literal-meaning reading concede that section 365(c) is written in 
the disjunctive and, therefore, by its plain language, would prohibit a debtor from “as-
suming or assigning.”  In re Sunterra, 361 F.3d at 265.  They contend, however, that the 
plain-meaning rule does not apply to section 365(c) because it would create inconsis-
tencies within the Code.  See discussion infra subsection IV.B.1.  
239 As noted before, the term “trustee” as used in the statute includes a Chapter 11 
debtor-in-possession.  In re Sunterra, 361 F.3d at 261 n.5; Perlman v. Catapult Entm’t, 
Inc. (In re Catapult Entm’t, Inc.), 165 F.3d 747, 750 (9th Cir. 1999); see also discussion 
supra note 42 (discussing the powers and rights of a bankruptcy trustee and a debtor-
in-possession).  
240 11 U.S.C. § 365(c)(1).  Although section 365(c) provides three different condi-
tions under which a trustee may not assume or assign an executory contract, this 
Comment is only concerned with the first condition, as it is the only condition relevant 
to patent licensing.  
241 See id. § 365(c)(1)(A); 1 DAVID G. EPSTEIN ET AL., BANKRUPTCY § 5-15, at 474 
(1992) (noting that the plain language of section 365(c)(1) “link[s] nonassignability 
under ‘applicable law’ together with a prohibition on assumption in bankruptcy”). 
242 See 11 U.S.C. § 365(c); In re Sunterra, 361 F.3d at 269 (holding that construing sec-
tion 365(c) to mean “assumption and assignment” would intrude on legislative function). 
243 Id. § 365(c)(1)(A). 
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consent.244  As courts have held, in order for a patent owner to exer-
cise its right to exclude to the fullest extent, the patent owner must be 
able to control the identity of its licensees.245  Because a patent license 
is merely a covenant not to sue for infringement, the patent owner 
cannot be forced to accept performance of the license from any party 
other than the one with whom it originally contracted.246  If the patent 
owner were forced to accept performance from a different party, then 
the owner would effectively lose control of its monopolistic right to 
exclude others from practicing the patented invention.247  Forcing the 
patent owner to accept performance from a third party would result in 
the patent owner forgoing its right to sue the third party for patent in-
fringement.248  Thus, because the “applicable law” of patent nonassig-
nability prevents the patent owner from having to accept performance 
from a third-party entity (i.e., a party other than the debtor or debtor-
in-possession), the debtor (i.e., the bankruptcy trustee or debtor-in-
possession) cannot assume the patent license. 
A patent owner is not required to accept performance of the li-
cense from an entity other than the entity with which it originally con-
tracted.249  In fact, because the debtor-in-possession is a separate legal 
entity from the original debtor, the patent owner can only accept per-
formance from the postpetition debtor-in-possession if there is an im-
plicit assumption and assignment of the license from the original deb-
 
244 See Rhone-Poulenc Agro, S.A. v. DeKalb Genetics Corp., 271 F.3d 1081, 1088-89 
(Fed. Cir. 2001) (discussing the principle of nontransferability of patents found in fed-
eral common law), vacated on other grounds en banc, 284 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2002); cf. In 
re W. Elecs. Inc., 852 F.2d 79, 83 (3d Cir. 1988) (describing the nontransferability of 
government contracts).  
245 See supra note 91 and accompanying text. 
246 See Rhone-Poulenc Agro, 271 F.3d at 1088 (noting that allowing free assignability 
of patent licenses would result in the patent holder losing “the very important ability to 
control the identity of the licensees”); Everex Sys., Inc. v. Cadtrack Corp. (In re CFLC, 
Inc.), 89 F.3d 673, 679 (9th Cir. 1996) (relying on the federal patent policy concern 
that the patent holder have the ability to control the identity of licensees and holding 
that nonexclusive patent licenses are not assignable). 
247 See Rhone-Poulenc Agro, 271 F.3d at 1088 (noting that permitting free assignabili-
ty would mean “every licensee would become a potential competitor with the licensor-
patent holder in the market for the invention; and even if the patentee could control 
the number of licenses, he would lose the very important ability to control the identity 
of the licensees”).  
248 See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2006) (stating that a party that “makes, uses, offers to 
sell, or sells any patented invention” without authority infringes the patent).  
249 See Rhone-Poulenc Agro, 271 F.3d at 1088 (“[P]atent licenses are . . . non-
transferable in the absence of an agreement authorizing assignment . . . .”); In re CFLC, 
89 F.3d at 679 (stating that a nonexclusive patent license cannot be assigned without 
the authorization of the patent owner).  
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tor to the debtor-in-possession.250  If section 365(c)(1)(A) did not con-
tain the language “debtor or debtor in possession,” it is likely that the 
federal common law principle of patent nonassignability would also for-
bid assumption of the license on the ground that the debtor is no longer 
the same legal entity as it was before it entered into bankruptcy.251 
Having established that section 365(c) prevents assumption of the 
patent license, I turn to whether assignment of the license would be 
permitted.252  Applying the conditions of subsection (1) to the assign-
ment prong, section 365(c)(1)(A) reads, “The trustee may not . . . as-
sign . . . any executory contract or unexpired lease of the debtor . . . if 
applicable law excuses a party . . . from accepting performance from 
or rendering performance to an entity other than the debtor or the 
debtor in possession.”253 
The analysis set forth in the assumption prong also applies to the 
assignment prong.  Under the patent nonassignability principle, the 
debtor-licensee does not have any property rights in the patent and, 
therefore, cannot assign the patent license to a third party without the 
licensor’s explicit consent.254  The identity of the third party—whether 
the third-party assignee is real or hypothetical—is irrelevant because in 
the absence of the licensor’s explicit consent, the debtor-licensee simp-
ly cannot make an assignment.255  Thus, the “applicable law” of patent 
nonassignability means the licensor does not have to accept perfor-
 
250 See supra Section I.A. 
251 See Perlman v. Catapult Entm’t, Inc. (In re Catapult Entm’t, Inc.), 165 F.3d 747, 
754-55 (9th Cir. 1999) (preventing the debtor from assuming the patent licenses); In 
re W. Elecs. Inc., 852 F.2d 79, 83 (3d Cir. 1988) (“[I]n the context of the assumption 
and assignment of executory contracts, a solvent contractor and an insolvent debtor in 
possession going through bankruptcy are materially distinct entities.”).  But see Bonne-
ville Power Admin. v. Mirant Corp. (In re Mirant Corp.), 440 F.3d 238, 248 (5th Cir. 
2006) (citing cases in which courts have held that the solvent contractor and insolvent 
debtor-in-possession going through bankruptcy are not different entities for purposes 
of the antiassignment principle).   
252 See, e.g., In re Catapult, 165 F.3d at 750 (noting that section 365(c)(1) “bars a 
debtor in possession from assuming an executory contract without the nondebtor’s 
consent where applicable law precludes assignment of the contract to a third party”).  
253 See 11 U.S.C. § 365(c)(1)(A) (2006). 
254 See supra note 98 and accompanying text. 
255 See RCI Tech. Corp. v. Sunterra Corp. (In re Sunterra Corp.), 361 F.3d 257, 266 
(4th Cir. 2004) (“Subsection (c)(1) bars assumption (absent consent) when ‘applica-
ble law’ would bar an assignment.”); In re Catapult, 165 F.3d at 750 (“[T]he statute by 
its terms bars a debtor in possession from assuming an executory contract without the 
nondebtor’s consent . . . .”); In re W. Elecs. Inc., 852 F.2d at 83 (“[T]he debtor in pos-
session was not entitled to assume the contract without the [licensor’s] consent . . . .”).  
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mance from an entity other than the debtor or debtor-in-possession, 
thereby preventing the debtor from assigning the patent license. 
Under a literal interpretation of the Code, section 365(c) forbids 
the debtor from either assuming or assigning the patent license.  This 
prohibition would apply even where the debtor-in-possession has no 
intention of assigning the contract in question to any real third party.256 
B.  The “or” as a Conjunctive “and” 
Critics of the hypothetical test argue that the disjunctive “or” must 
be read as a conjunctive “and.”257  Although these critics acknowledge 
that section 365(c) is, in fact, constructed in the disjunctive and by its 
plain language prohibits assumption or assignment, they maintain that 
the plain-meaning rule should not apply for three reasons:  (1) the 
literal reading creates inconsistencies within the Code, (2) the literal 
reading is incompatible with the legislative history of section 365, and 
(3) the literal reading goes against sound bankruptcy policy.258  In-
stead, they argue that the proper interpretation of section 365(c) re-
quires a case-by-case inquiry into whether the nondebtor’s contract 
will actually be assigned, or whether the nondebtor will actually be 
asked to accept performance from a third party other than the debtor 
or debtor-in-possession.259  As will be discussed, however, these argu-
ments do not justify departing from the plain-meaning rule, and the 
literal reading of section 365(c) must prevail. 
 
256 See In re Sunterra, 361 F.3d at 262 n.8 (finding the intent of the debtor-in-
possession to assign to a third party irrelevant if the statute is read literally).  
257 See Bonneville Power Admin. v. Mirant Corp. (In re Mirant Corp.), 440 F.3d 
238, 249 (5th Cir. 2006) (adopting the actual test); In re Sunterra, 361 F.3d at 265-68 
(detailing the argument that certain conflicts within the statute preclude a plain-
meaning reading of the statute); Summit Inv. & Dev. Corp. v. Leroux, 69 F.3d 608, 612-
13 (1st Cir. 1995) (preferring the actual test). 
258 See In re Catapult, 165 F.3d at 751 (detailing the debtor’s arguments against the 
use of the plain-meaning rule); see also Institut Pasteur v. Cambridge Biotech Corp., 
104 F.3d 489, 493 (1st Cir. 1997) (rejecting the hypothetical test in favor of a case-by-
case approach); Sullivan v. CIA, 992 F.2d 1249, 1252 (1st Cir. 1993) (noting that “liter-
al” interpretations that lead to absurd results should be avoided).  But see Leroux, 69 
F.3d at 610 (“Plain statutory language does not prompt recourse to countervailing leg-
islative history.”).   
259 See In re Mirant, 440 F.3d at 248 (emphasizing the importance of whether a con-
tract will actually be assigned or whether a nondebtor will actually be forced to accept 
performance from a third party); Leroux, 69 F.3d at 612-13 (interpreting the legislative 
history to require “a case-by-case inquiry into the actual consequences . . . of permitting 
these executory contracts to be performed by the debtor party”).  
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1.  Does the Literal Reading Create Inconsistencies? 
a.  Section 365(c)’s Interaction with Section 365(f)(1) 
Proponents of the actual test contend that a literal reading of sec-
tion 365(c) would implicate the absurdity exception to the plain-
meaning rule of statutory interpretation.260  In order to achieve inter-
nal consistency, they argue, the court must interpret the statute so as 
to minimize discord among related provisions.261  Specifically, they 
maintain that a literal reading of section 365(c) would render section 
365(f)(1) inoperative and superfluous.262 
Subsection (f)(1) provides that executory contracts, once assumed, 
may be assigned notwithstanding any contrary provisions contained in 
the contract or applicable law: 
Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c) of this section, notwith-
standing a provision in an executory contract or unexpired lease of the 
debtor, or in applicable law, that prohibits, restricts, or conditions the 
assignment of such contract or lease, the trustee may assign such con-
tract or lease under paragraph (2) of this subsection.263 
The conflict arises from subsections (c)(1) and (f)(1)’s treatment of 
“applicable law.”  The plain language of subsection (c)(1) bars as-
sumption whenever “applicable law” would bar assignment.264  Subsec-
tion (f)(1), however, states that executory contracts may be assigned, 
contrary provisions in applicable law notwithstanding.265  But, in order for a 
 
260 See Sigmon Coal Co. v. Apfel, 226 F.3d 291, 304 (4th Cir. 2000) (noting that an 
exception to application of a statute’s plain language exists when “a literal reading of a 
statute . . . results in an outcome that can truly be characterized as absurd, i.e., that is ‘so 
gross as to shock the general moral or common sense’” (citation omitted) (quoting Md. 
State Dep’t of Educ. v. U.S. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 98 F.3d 165, 169 (4th Cir. 1996)).  
261 See 2A NORMAN J. SINGER & J.D. SHAMBIE SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY 
CONSTRUCTION § 46:6 (7th ed. 2007) (“A statute should be construed so that effect is 
given to all its provisions, so that no part will be inoperative or superfluous, void or in-
significant, and so that one section will not destroy another unless the provision is the 
result of obvious mistake or error.” (footnotes omitted)). 
262 See In re Sunterra, 361 F.3d at 265-66 (discussing the “seemingly warring provi-
sions of § 365(c)(1) and § 365(f)(1)”); In re Catapult, 165 F.3d at 751 (noting that “a 
literal reading of subsection (c)(1) appears to render subsection (f)(1) superfluous”); 
see also Breeden v. Catron (In re Catron), 158 B.R. 629, 636-37 (E.D. Va. 1993) (explor-
ing the apparent conflict between subsections (c)(1) and (f)(1)); In re Cardinal In-
dus., Inc., 116 B.R. 964, 976-77 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1990) (examining the trustee’s ar-
gument that (c)(1) and (f)(1) conflict).  
263 11 U.S.C. § 365(f)(1) (2006).  
264 Id. § 365(c)(1); see also discussion supra Section IV.A.  
265 11 U.S.C. § 365(f)(1).  
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contract to be assigned, the debtor must first assume it.266  A literal 
reading of section 365(c)(1) would thus render section 365(f)(1) in-
operative and superfluous.267 
The Sixth Circuit, however, reconciled the two provisions in In re 
Magness,268 noting that “each subsection recognizes an ‘applicable law’ 
of markedly different scope.”269  Subsection (f)(1) states the default 
rule by nullifying applicable law that “prohibits, restricts, or conditions 
the assignment of” an executory contract.270  Subsection (c), however, 
functions as an exception to this default rule.271  As noted by one cir-
cuit court, “Thus, the ‘applicable law’ to which subsection (c) refers 
must mean ‘applicable law’ other than general prohibitions barring 
assignment.”272  In fact, the exception under subsection (c) does not 
merely refer to law that generally bans assignment of executory con-
tracts but instead that more specifically “excuses a party . . . from ac-
cepting performance from or rendering performance to an entity” 
other than the one with whom it originally contracted.273  The appli-
cable law referred to in subsection (c) prevails over subsection 
(f)(1).274  As a result, the two subsections do not conflict.  Under the 
default rule defined in subsection (f)(1), “applicable law” is law that 
 
266 See id. § 365(f)(2)(A) (providing that the trustee may assign an executory con-
tract if the trustee first assumes such a contract in accordance with the provisions of 
section 365).  
267 See In re Catron, 158 B.R. at 636 (concluding that the “[c]onflict between sub-
sections (c) and (f) of § 365 is inescapable”). 
268 Rieser v. Dayton Country Club Co. (In re Magness), 972 F.2d 689 (6th Cir. 
1992).  
269 Id. at 695; see also City of Jamestown, Tenn. v. James Cable Partners, L.P. (In re 
James Cable Partners, L.P.), 27 F.3d 534, 537-38 (11th Cir. 1994) (noting that subsec-
tions (c) and (f) refer to different applicable law); In re Antonelli, 148 B.R. 443, 448 (D. 
Md. 1992) (stating that the distinction drawn in In re Magness is correct), aff’d, 4 F.3d 
984 (4th Cir. 1993); In re Lil’ Things, Inc., 220 B.R. 583, 590-91 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1998) 
(agreeing that (f)(1) states the general rule and that (c)(1)(A) is an exception to it). 
270 See In re Magness, 972 F.2d at 695 (acknowledging subsection (f) as the default); 
see also In re James Cable, 27 F.3d at 538 (same). 
271 See 11 U.S.C. § 365(f)(1) (applying the default rule “[e]xcept as provided in 
subsection[] . . . (c) of this section”).  
272 In re James Cable, 27 F.3d at 538.  
273 11 U.S.C. § 365(c)(1)(A); see also RCI Tech. Corp. v. Sunterra Corp. (In re Sun-
terra Corp.), 361 F.3d 257, 266-67 (4th Cir. 2004) (noting that subsection (c) recogniz-
es a specific exception to the broad rule pronounced in subsection (f)); In re James Ca-
ble, 27 F.3d at 538 (holding that the applicable law referred to in subsection (c) does not 
include general prohibitions on assignments); In re Magness, 972 F.2d at 695 (asserting 
that subsection (c) refers to laws other than those generally prohibiting assignments).  
274 In re James Cable, 27 F.3d at 538 (noting that subsection (c) permits diminishing 
the trustee’s power to assume or assign that is otherwise honored by subsection (f)). 
YING_FINAL REVISED.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 3/17/2010  10:18 AM 
2010] The Plain Meaning of Section 365(c) 1265 
generally prohibits or restricts assignments, while the “applicable law” 
provision of subsection (c) refers to “legal excuses for refusing to 
render or accept performance, regardless of the contract’s status as 
‘assignable.’”275 
To determine whether subsection (f)(1) nullifies a law prohibit-
ing assignments, a court must inquire into why “applicable law” prohi-
bits the assignment.276  Section 365(c) provides an exception to the de-
fault rule only where the law prohibits assignment of the contract on 
the rationale that the identity of the contracting party is material to the 
agreement and is therefore “non-delegable.”277  The federal common 
law principle of patent nonassignability states that a patent owner is not 
required to accept performance of the license from an entity other than 
the entity with which it originally contracted.278  This principle fits 
squarely within the exception given by section 365(c) because the iden-
tity of the debtor-licensee is, in fact, material to the underlying li-
cense.279  Accordingly, reading section 365(c) to prevent the debtor-
licensee from assuming or assigning the patent license without the pa-
tent owner’s consent neither creates inconsistency with section 
365(f)(1) nor renders subsection (f)(1) inoperative or superfluous.280 
b.  Section 365(c)’s Interaction with Section 365(e) 
Proponents of the actual test also contend that a literal reading of 
section 365(c) is incompatible with section 365(e) of the Bankruptcy 
 
275 In re Magness, 972 F.2d at 699 (Guy, J., concurring).  
276 See Perlman v. Catapult Entm’t, Inc. (In re Catapult Entm’t, Inc.), 165 F.3d 747, 
752 (9th Cir. 1999) (“[I]n determining whether an ‘applicable law’ stands or falls under 
§ 365(f)(1), a court must ask why the ‘applicable law’ prohibits assignment.”); In re Anto-
nelli, 148 B.R. 443, 448 (Bankr. D. Md. 1992) (discussing why a provision in the Uniform 
Partnership Act prohibits assignment in order to determine which subsection to apply), 
aff’d, 4 F.3d 984 (4th Cir. 1993).  
277 See In re Magness, 972 F.2d at 700 (Guy, J., concurring) (arguing that section 
365(c) sought to preserve contracts in which the identity of the original contracting par-
ty was material and there was a right of refusal); In re Antonelli, 148 B.R. at 448 (noting 
that section 365(c) applies “where contracts are held to be non-assignable because they 
impose upon the debtor duties which are said to be ‘non-delegable’”).  
278 See supra Section III.A (discussing the federal common law principle of patent 
nonassignability). 
279 See supra note 91 and accompanying text (concluding that a patent owner’s 
right to exclude includes the right to control its licensee’s identity).  
280 See RCI Tech. Corp. v. Sunterra Corp. (In re Sunterra Corp.), 361 F.3d 257, 
266-67 (4th Cir. 2004) (concluding that subsections (c) and (f) are not irreconcilable 
when applied to a software license agreement); In re Catapult, 165 F.3d at 752 (con-
cluding that section 365(c) is not at odds with section 365(f)). 
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Code, which prohibits enforcement of ipso facto clauses in bankrupt-
cy proceedings.281  Section 365(e)(1)(B) states, 
Notwithstanding a provision in an executory contract or unexpired 
lease, or in applicable law, an executory contract or unexpired lease of 
the debtor may not be terminated or modified, and any right or obliga-
tion under such contract or lease may not be terminated or modified, at 
any time after the commencement of the case solely because of a provi-
sion in such contract or lease that is conditioned on . . . the commence-
ment of a case under this title.
282
 
Section 365(e) provides an exception to the general anti–ipso facto 
rule in subsection (e)(2)(A):  “Paragraph (1) of this subsection does 
not apply to an executory contract . . . if (A)(i) applicable law excuses a 
party . . . from accepting performance from or rendering performance to the trus-
tee or to an assignee of such contract . . . and (ii) such party does not con-
sent to such assumption or assignment . . . .”283  Critics of the hypothet-
ical test, which is premised on a literal reading, argue that the 
subsection (e)(2)(A) exception requires that the nondebtor party 
make an “actual showing—prior to any termination of the debtor’s 
postpetition contract rights—that the nondebtor party . . . would not 
be forced to accept performance under its executory contract from 
someone other than the debtor party with whom it originally con-
tracted.”284  Thus, they argue that the hypothetical test is inappropriate 
because, unless the nondebtor party can make a showing of the deb-
tor’s actual intent to assign the contract, the subsection (e)(2)(A) ex-
ception cannot be triggered.285  If the subsection (e)(2)(A) exception 
is not triggered, then the anti–ipso facto provision of subsection 
(e)(1)(A) will remain in effect, leaving the statute at odds with the an-
tiassignment provision of subsection (c)(1)(A).286 
 
281 See Summit Inv. & Dev. Corp. v. Leroux, 69 F.3d 608, 612 (1st Cir. 1995) (hold-
ing that “[a] proper construction of section 365(e)[] requires consideration of com-
panion section 365(c)”).  
282 11 U.S.C. § 365(e)(1)(B) (2006).  
283 Id. § 365(e)(2)(A) (emphasis added).  
284 Leroux, 69 F.3d at 612.  
285 See id. (holding that the exception to the anti–ipso facto rule was only intended 
to prevent the nondebtor from being at the debtor’s mercy “by what amounts to an ac-
tual ‘assignment’”). 
286 See id. at 613 (noting that if section 365(e)(2)(A) automatically terminated a 
debtor’s executory contract rights, the exception would conflict with subsection 
(c)(1)); see also Bonneville Power Admin. v. Mirant Corp. (In re Mirant Corp.), 440 
F.3d 238, 248-49 (5th Cir. 2006) (adopting the actual test because the alternative 
would create conflict with subsection (c)(1)).  
YING_FINAL REVISED.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 3/17/2010  10:18 AM 
2010] The Plain Meaning of Section 365(c) 1267 
Such an interpretation is premised on the notion that subsection 
(e)(2)(A) must be actually triggered.  According to the statute, there 
are two situations in which the exception applies:  (1) when applicable 
law excuses a party from accepting performance from or rendering 
performance to the trustee, and (2) when applicable law excuses a par-
ty from accepting performance from or rendering performance to an 
assignee of a contract.287 
Supporters of the actual test argue that the subsection (e)(2)(A) 
exception does not apply in the context of patent licensing because 
“applicable law” does not excuse the nondebtor party from accepting 
performance from the trustee.288  This, however, is a faulty assumption 
when the “applicable law” in question is the federal common law prin-
ciple of patent nonassignability.  This principle protects a nondebtor 
licensor from having to accept performance of the license by an entity 
other than that with which it originally contracted.289  The preban-
kruptcy debtor, however, is not the same legal entity as the debtor-in-
possession or trustee.290  Thus, the “applicable law” of patent nonassig-
nability does, in fact, prevent a nondebtor licensor from having to ac-
cept performance from the debtor-in-possession or trustee.  The non-
debtor patent licensor, then, falls within the exception to the general 
prohibition on ipso facto clauses set forth in section 365(e)(2)(A). 
Furthermore, the federal principle of patent nonassignability also 
implicates the second situation in which section 365(e)(2)(A) applies.  
The principle forbids the assignment of patent licenses without the 
explicit consent of the patent owner.291  Thus, the “applicable law” of 
patent nonassignability also protects the nondebtor licensor from hav-
ing to accept performance from an assignee of the license, because 
the debtor-licensee cannot assign the patent license without the con-
sent of the nondebtor licensor.292  The identity of the third-party as-
signee—whether real or speculative—is irrelevant, because the debtor-
 
287 11 U.S.C. § 365(e)(2)(A)(i). 
288 See In re Mirant Corp., 440 F.3d at 248-49. 
289 See supra note 91 and accompanying text (emphasizing that a patent owner’s 
exclusive right to an invention necessarily provides control over the identity of the per-
forming party of a license). 
290 See discussion supra Section II.D (recognizing that a prebankruptcy petition deb-
tor is a different legal entity than a postbankruptcy petition debtor by reference to sec-
tion 541(a)). 
291 See id. (describing the patent owner’s exclusive right to determine who receives 
an assignment). 
292 See supra note 91 (listing cases that recognize that licensees must get the licen-
sor’s consent before assigning a license). 
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licensee simply cannot assign the license to a third-party assignee.293  
There is no need to require an actual showing that the debtor-licensee 
intends to transfer the license to a third-party assignee, because the 
debtor-licensee cannot act without the licensor’s consent.  Based upon 
this protection, the federal common law of patent nonassignability al-
so falls within the second situation in which the exception under sec-
tion 365(e)(2)(A) applies.294  Accordingly, the anti–ipso facto provi-
sions of section 365(e)(1) are not implicated.295 
When the federal common law principle of patent nonassignabili-
ty constitutes “applicable law” under section 365(e)(2)(A), both situa-
tions in which the exception to the general anti–ipso facto provision 
of section 365(e)(1) applies are met.  The carve out in subsection 
(e)(2)(A) then protects the nondebtor party from having to accept 
performance from, or render performance to, a party with whom 
there was no original contract.296  Similar to the so-called “conflict” be-
tween section 365(e) and section 365(f), when the identity of the party 
from whom the nondebtor party must accept or to whom the nondeb-
tor party must render performance is material, “applicable law” will 
protect the nondebtor party from having to honor the contract when 
the party is no longer the originally contracted party.297  As the courts 
have held, when “applicable law” serves to protect the nondebtor party 
in this specific manner, the provisions of section 365(c) will apply.298 
 
293 See RCI Tech. Corp. v. Sunterra Corp. (In re Sunterra Corp.), 361 F.3d 257, 271 
(4th Cir. 2004) (holding that the license owner had not consented to assumption by a 
third party and that assumption was therefore invalid); Perlman v. Catapult Entm’t, 
Inc. (In re Catapult Entm’t, Inc.), 165 F.3d 747, 750-51 (9th Cir. 1999) (emphasizing 
that without consent of the licensor, assignment to third party was invalid); In re W. 
Elecs. Inc., 852 F.2d 79, 83 (3d Cir. 1988) (noting a debtor’s inability to assign licenses 
to third parties unilaterally). 
294 See 11 U.S.C. § 365(e)(2)(A) (2006).  
295 See id. § 365(e)(1).  
296 Cf. In re Sunterra, 361 F.3d at 262-63 (explaining that under one test but not the 
other, the licensor, would be held excused from its agreement to protect it from non-
consensual assignment to a third party); In re Catapult, 165 F.3d at 750 (“[T]he statute 
by its terms bars a debtor in possession from assuming an executory contract without 
the nondebtor’s consent where applicable law precludes assignment of the contract to a 
third party.”); In re W. Elecs., 852 F.2d at 83 (same). 
297 See Rieser v. Dayton Country Club Co. (In re Magness), 972 F.2d 689, 699-700 
(6th Cir. 1992) (Guy, J., concurring) (finding that where the identity of the original 
contracting party was material, section 365(c) sought to preserve a right of refusal); In 
re Antonelli, 148 B.R. 443, 448 (D. Md. 1992) (noting that section 365(c) applies where 
contracts are held to be nonassignable because they impose upon the debtor duties 
which are said to be “non-delegable”), aff’d, 4 F.3d 984 (4th Cir. 1993). 
298 See In re Sunterra, 361 F.3d at 262; In re Catapult, 165 F.3d at 750; In re W. Elecs., 
852 F.2d at 83. 
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Thus, there is no conflict between section 365(c), which prohibits 
the assignment of contracts, and section 365(e), which nullifies ipso fac-
to clauses.  Instead, section 365(c) operates in conjunction with section 
365(e):  when the section 365(e)(2)(A) exception is triggered, section 
365(e)(1) no longer applies. 
2.  The Legislative History of Section 365 
As a matter of statutory construction, when a statute is clear and un-
ambiguous on its face, the Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that re-
course to the statute’s legislative history is inappropriate.299  A court can 
only look beyond an unambiguous statute to consult legislative history if 
a literal reading of the statute produces an outcome that is “demonstra-
bly at odds” with clearly expressed congressional intent or results in an 
absurd outcome—one that is “so gross as to shock the general moral or 
common sense.”300  Such instances, however, are exceptionally rare.301  
Generally, the courts have held that the intent of Congress as a whole is 
more apparent from the words of a statute itself than from a patchwork 
record of statements; there is a “strong presumption that Congress ex-
presses its intent through the language it chooses.”302 
Proponents of the actual test argue that the literal reading of sec-
tion 365(c) is at odds with the legislative history of the statute.303  Sec-
tion 365(c), as it presently reads, was added to the Bankruptcy Code 
in the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984 
(1984 Act).304  The 1984 Act was enacted primarily to rectify the con-
 
299 See, e.g., Toibb v. Radloff, 501 U.S. 157, 162 (1991) (“[T]his Court has repeated 
with some frequency:  ‘Where, as here, the resolution of a question of federal law turns 
on a statute and the intention of Congress, we look first to the statutory language and 
then to the legislative history if the statutory language is unclear.’” (quoting Blum v. 
Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 896 (1984))). 
300 Crooks v. Harrelson, 282 U.S. 55, 59-60 (1930); see also United States v. Ron 
Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 242 (1989). 
301 See Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 187 n.33 (1978) (explaining that 
courts should look beyond the text only in exceptional cases). 
302 INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 432 n.12 (1987). 
303 See, e.g., Bonneville Power Admin. v. Mirant Corp. (In re Mirant Corp.), 440 F.3d 
238, 249-51 (5th Cir. 2006) (adopting the actual test based on an interpretation of Con-
gress’s intent and the legislative history of section 365(c)).  Where a court has adopted 
the hypothetical test, litigants often advocate for adoption of the actual test following a 
similar line of reasoning as the Mirant court.  See In re Sunterra, 361 F.3d at 269-70 (stat-
ing that the proponent of the actual test argued that it was “‘far more harmonious’ with 
bankruptcy policy” and Congress’s intent); In re Catapult, 165 F.3d at 753 (recalling that 
the litigants argued that the “legislative history requires disregard of the plain language 
of § 365(c)(1)” and thus the court should adopt the actual test).  
304 Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333. 
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stitutional crisis stemming from the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co.305  It also 
served to address the Court’s decision allowing bankruptcy trustees to 
reject collective bargaining agreements in NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildis-
co.306  Congress simultaneously took the opportunity to incorporate 
several other acts involving the Bankruptcy Code, many of which had 
been pending in Congress.307 
Section 362(a) of the 1984 Act amended 11 U.S.C. § 365(c)(1)(A) 
by substituting the phrase “an entity other than the debtor or the deb-
tor in possession” for the words “the trustee.”308  There is, however, no 
legislative history for the 1984 Act relevant to section 365.309  Given the 
urgency with which the 1984 Act was passed, its legislative “history” is 
comprised solely of statements inserted, rather than actually read, into 
the Congressional Record.310  Likewise, there is no authoritative legisla-
tive history for the 1984 versions of its component acts.  The 1984 Act 
originated in a 1980 House amendment to an earlier Senate bill that 
sought to “correct technical errors, clarify and make minor substantive 
changes” to the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978.311  The 1980 House 
amendment was accompanied by “a relatively obscure committee re-
port”312 stating, 
This amendment makes it clear that the prohibition against a trustee’s 
power to assume an executory contract does not apply where it is the 
debtor that is in possession and the performance to be given or received 
under a personal service contract will be the same as if no petition had 
been filed because of the personal service nature of the contract.
313
 
Courts that adopt the actual test in favor of the hypothetical test 
tend to rely upon this 1980 report for support.314  According to them, 
the statement clearly indicates that Congress did not intend section 
 
305 458 U.S. 50 (1982). 
306 465 U.S. 513 (1984).  
307 In re Cardinal Indus., Inc., 116 B.R. 964, 978-80 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1990) (re-
counting the legislative history of the 1984 Act).  
308 Compare 11 U.S.C. § 365(c)(1)(A) (1982), with Pub. L. No. 98-353, sec. 362(a), 
§ 365(c)(1)(A), 98 Stat. at 362. 
309 See RCI Tech. Corp. v. Sunterra Corp. (In re Sunterra Corp.), 361 F.3d 257, 270 
(4th Cir. 2004) (explaining that there is no legislative history relevant to the alterations 
made to section 365 in the 1984 Act). 
310 130 CONG. REC. 20,206-34 (1984); 130 CONG. REC. 20,080-94 (1984), reprinted 
in COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY app. 4, pt. xx (Lawrence P. King ed., 15th ed. 1996).  
311 H.R. REP. NO. 96-1195, at 1 (1980). 
312 EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 241, § 5-15, at 475.  
313 H.R. REP. NO. 96-1195, at 12.  
314 See, e.g., Summit Inv. & Dev. Corp. v. Leroux, 69 F.3d 608, 613 (1st Cir. 1995).  
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365(c)(1) to preclude assumption of an otherwise nonassignable per-
sonal service contract if “the performance to be given or received . . . 
will be the same as if no petition had been filed.”315  Rather, they main-
tain that “§ 365(c)(1) provides that a debtor in possession can assume 
a personal service contract that is nonassignable . . . as long as its per-
formance [would] be the same as if no petition had been filed.”316 
Furthermore, these courts note that the actual language of subsec-
tion (c)(1) says “the debtor or the debtor in possession” and not simp-
ly “the debtor in possession.”317  To them, neither a debtor nor a deb-
tor-in-possession is barred from assuming the underlying contract 
under section 365(c).318  Accordingly, in their view, the hypothetical 
test is inappropriate because the debtor should not be prohibited 
from simply assuming the contract when Congress clearly intended to 
allow such an assumption.319 
A literal reading of the statute, however, does not produce an ab-
surd outcome that is “demonstrably at odds” with its legislative history.  
The single statement made in the 1980 House amendment report is 
not enough to render the literal reading of section 365(c) improper.320  
In general, a court should not look to the legislative history of a statute 
if there is no ambiguity in the statute’s plain language.321  A court may 
only depart from the plain-meaning rule where the legislative history 
clearly indicates that Congress intended something other than what the 
statute actually says.322  Even if legislative history suggests an interpreta-
 
315 Id. at 613 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 96-1195, at 12). 
316 In re Cardinal Indus., Inc., 116 B.R. 964, 979 (S.D. Ohio 1990).  
317 See 11 U.S.C. § 365(c)(1)(A) (2006).  
318 See Leroux, 69 F.3d at 613.  
319 See id. 
320 See In re Cardinal, 116 B.R. at 979 (acknowledging that “[s]ection 365(c) con-
tinues to bar the trustee from assuming a contract in those cases where applicable law 
excuses the nondebtor from accepting performance from the trustee”).  
321 See, e.g., Davis v. Mich. Dep’t of Treasury, 489 U.S. 803, 809 n.3 (1989) (“Legis-
lative history is irrelevant to the interpretation of an unambiguous statute.”).  
322 See City of Auburn v. United States, 154 F.3d 1025, 1029 (9th Cir. 1998) (ad-
dressing the near-total exclusivity of unambiguous statutory language); California v. 
Montrose Chem. Corp. of Cal., 104 F.3d 1507, 1515 (9th Cir. 1997) (“Because we con-
clude that the language of these sections is not ambiguous, we must follow the plain 
language of these sections unless the legislative history clearly indicates that Congress 
intended otherwise.”); cf. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 184 (1991) (holding that an 
administrative agency’s construction of a statute “may not be disturbed as an abuse of 
discretion if it reflects a plausible construction of the plain language of the statute and 
does not otherwise conflict with Congress’ expressed intent”); Edward J. DeBartolo 
Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988) 
(concluding that “where an otherwise acceptable construction of a statute would raise 
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tion contrary to a statute’s plain meaning, that is “not necessarily suffi-
cient to override the Plain Meaning Rule.”323 
Here, there is only a single statement, made in a “relatively ob-
scure committee report,”324 that suggests any intent contrary to the lit-
eral reading of section 365(c).  Further, this committee report was 
part of the legislative history of the 1980 House amendment, not the 
actual 1984 Act passed by Congress.  As the record reflects, there is 
remarkably little, if any, legislative history that would enable definitive 
statements regarding Congress’s intent.  Thus, though the committee 
report’s statement is worthy of consideration, it is not the sort of con-
clusive legislative history that would trump the plain language of the 
statute.325  There is no clear indication that Congress intended some-
thing other than the disjunctive “or” language of section 365(c).  Had 
Congress intended the “or” to be read as a conjunctive “and,” it would 
have written or amended the statute to read “assume and assign.”326  
Since Congress has not amended section 365(c) in this respect, a 
court is “not free to replace . . . [a statute’s plain meaning] with an 
unenacted legislative intent.”327  When the terms of a statute are clear 
and unambiguous, a court’s inquiry ends, and it has the duty of en-
forcing the terms of the statute as Congress has drafted it.328 
 
serious constitutional problems, the Court will construe the statute to avoid such prob-
lems unless such construction is plainly contrary to the intent of Congress”).  
323 RCI Tech. Corp. v. Sunterra Corp. (In re Sunterra Corp.), 361 F.3d 257, 270 
(4th Cir. 2004); see also Sigmon Coal Co. v. Apfel, 226 F.3d 291, 306 (4th Cir. 2000) 
(declining to rely on legislative history to displace the plain meaning of a statute, par-
ticularly because such history consisted of only a statement made by a single member 
of Congress), aff’d sub nom. Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438 (2002). 
324 EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 241, § 5-15, at 475. 
325 See Garcia v. United States, 469 U.S. 70, 76-78 (1984) (declining to allow “snip-
pet[s]” of legislative history to undermine the statute’s plain language); U.S. Dep’t of 
State v. Wash. Post Co., 456 U.S. 595, 600 (1982) (“Passing references and isolated 
phrases are not controlling when analyzing a legislative history.”). 
326 See Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983) (“[W]here Congress in-
cludes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another . . . it is 
generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate in-
clusion or exclusion.” (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Wong Kim Bo, 
472 F.2d 720, 722 (5th Cir. 1972))). 
327 United States v. Morison, 844 F.2d 1057, 1064 (4th Cir. 1988) (quoting INS v. 
Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 453 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring)).  
328 See, e.g., Lamie v. U.S. Tr., 540 U.S. 526, 534 (2004) (“[W]hen the statute’s lan-
guage is plain, the sole function of the courts—at least where the disposition required 
by the text is not absurd—is to enforce it according to its terms.” (internal quotation 
marks omitted) (quoting Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Union Planters Bank, N.A., 
530 U.S. 1, 6 (2000))); Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917) (“[T]he 
sole function of the courts is to enforce [the statute] according to its terms.”). 
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Furthermore, the literal reading of section 365(c) hardly results in 
an outcome that can be characterized as “absurd”—an outcome that 
“shock[s] the general moral or common sense.”329  The statute limits 
the trustee’s or debtor-in-possession’s power to assume or assign a 
contract by confirming the nondebtor’s rights under applicable non-
bankruptcy law.330  This limitation prevents the trustee from assuming 
or assigning the contract because, in either case, the nondebtor party 
would be forced to accept performance by “an entity other than the 
debtor or the debtor in possession.”331  Similarly, when the limitation 
is applied to the debtor party itself, the debtor-in-possession cannot 
assign the contract because the nondebtor party would still be forced 
to accept performance from a party with which it did not originally 
contract.332  In the context of patent licensing, where the “applicable 
law” is the federal common law principle of patent nonassignability, 
these limitations are of particular importance due to the materiality of 
the licensee’s identity.333  Thus, the literal reading of section 365(c) 
does not result in an “absurd” outcome.  Rather, the outcome protects 
the nondebtor party’s ability to receive “the full benefit of [its] bar-
gain”334 were a third party to be substituted for the debtor from whom 
performance is sought. 
As noted by several courts, the language of section 365(c) is clear 
and unambiguous.335  Nevertheless, even if the language left room for 
ambiguity such that a court should turn to the legislative history for 
 
329 Crooks v. Harrelson, 282 U.S. 55, 59-60 (1930); see also United States v. Ron Pair 
Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 242 (1989) (“The plain meaning of legislation should be 
conclusive, except in the ‘rare cases [in which] the literal application of a statute will 
produce a result demonstrably at odds with the intentions of its drafters.’” (alteration in 
original) (quoting Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 571 (1982))). 
330 See RCI Tech. Corp. v. Sunterra Corp. (In re Sunterra Corp.), 361 F.3d 257, 269-
70 (4th Cir. 2004) (holding that the language of section 365(c) should be interpreted 
by literally reading its text because the legislative history does not conclusively indicate 
contrary intent).  
331 11 U.S.C. § 365(c)(1)(A) (2006).  
332 See id. (preventing a trustee from assuming or assigning an executory contract 
if “applicable law excuses a party . . . from accepting performance from or rendering 
performance to an entity other than the debtor or the debtor in possession”). 
333 For a discussion of the rationale behind the bar on assigning patents, see supra 
note 91 and accompanying text. 
334 S. REP. NO. 95-989, at 59 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5845. 
335 See, e.g., In re Sunterra, 361 F.3d at 265 (acknowledging that both parties agreed 
that a literal reading of the statute prohibits “assuming or assigning” an agreement); 
Perlman v. Catapult Entm’t, Inc. (In re Catapult Entm’t, Inc.), 165 F.3d 747, 751 (9th 
Cir. 1999) (“Catapult urges us to abandon the literal language of § 365(c)(1) in favor 
of an alternative approach . . . .”). 
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guidance, there is little evidence to suggest that the court should de-
part from the default rule of applying the statute’s plain meaning.  The 
literal reading of section 365(c) is neither at odds with its legislative 
history nor results in an “absurd” outcome that would “shock the gen-
eral moral or common sense.”336  Thus, there is no reason for a court to 
depart from the plain-meaning rule when interpreting the statute.337 
3.  The Literal Reading and General Bankruptcy Policies 
Proponents of the actual test also contend that “a literal reading 
of [section 365(c)] conflicts with general bankruptcy policy, implicat-
ing the absurdity and intent exceptions to the [plain-meaning 
rule].”338  They maintain that the literal reading undermines “the gen-
eral bankruptcy policy of fostering a successful reorganization and 
maximizing the value of the debtor’s assets,” because it undermines 
the debtor party’s ability to restructure itself effectively.339  The literal 
reading of section 365(c) prevents a debtor party from assuming a pa-
tent license, even in situations where the debtor party has no inten-
tion of actually assigning the patent license to a real third party.  Un-
der the statute, the nondebtor licensor can compel rejection of the 
patent license.  Without the ability to assume and continue using the 
license, the debtor loses a substantial asset that could seriously affect 
its ability to conduct business.340 
Unsurprisingly, as the case law has demonstrated, bankruptcy 
courts tend to favor the actual test rather than a literal reading under 
the hypothetical test.341  Nevertheless, even if there were merit to the 
 
336 Crooks v. Harrelson, 282 U.S. 55, 59-60 (1930). 
337 See In re Sunterra, 361 F.3d at 268 (noting that “[i]n assessing whether a plain 
reading of a statute implicates the absurdity exception, however, the issue is not 
whether the result would be ‘unreasonable,’ or even ‘quite unreasonable,’ but whether 
the result would be absurd”).  
338 Id. at 267-68; see also In re Cardinal Indus., Inc., 116 B.R. 964, 976 (Bankr. S.D. 
Ohio 1990) (“The literal application of these provisions, argues the Trustee, makes no 
sense.  Therefore, the [Trustee argues that the] Court must look to the legislative history 
and ascertain the intent of Congress.”); 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 365.06[1][d][iii] 
(Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Summer eds., 15th rev. ed. 2009) (arguing that sound 
bankruptcy policy supports the actual test). 
339 In re Sunterra, 361 F.3d at 268; see also supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text. 
340 See, e.g., Institut Pasteur v. Cambridge Biotech Corp., 104 F.3d 489, 490-91 (1st 
Cir. 1997) (describing how the patent licenses in question were essential to the deb-
tor’s line of business).  
341 See, e.g., Bonneville Power Admin. v. Mirant Corp. (In re Mirant Corp.), 440 
F.3d 238, 254-55 (5th Cir. 2006) (upholding the bankruptcy court’s application of the 
actual test); In re Sunterra, 361 F.3d at 261-63 (noting that the bankruptcy court and 
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public policy argument against enforcement of the statute, “such ar-
guments must necessarily fail in the face of an unambiguous sta-
tute.”342  As noted by the Supreme Court, if poor policy choices pro-
duce undesirable results, it is up to Congress, not the courts, to amend 
the statute.343  Only Congress can modify a statutory provision to 
achieve a preferable policy outcome.344 
Under the advocated actual test, the disjunctive “or” of section 
365(c) would be read as a conjunctive “and,” thereby effectively read-
ing the term “assume” out of the statute.345  Such an interpretation re-
sults in “the statute only prohibit[ing] assumption and assignment, as 
opposed to assumption or assignment.”346  Reading the “or” as a con-
junctive “and” creates a much narrower exception under section 
365(c)(1).  Accordingly, the actual test’s interpretation affords the 
debtor party a much broader scope of protection than the literal read-
ing of the statute provides.  While this interpretation may be appeal-
ing from a bankruptcy policy perspective, a court “cannot adopt [such 
an interpretation] . . . without trespassing on a function reserved for 
the legislative branch.”347  A federal court’s function is limited to “de-
termin[ing] the meaning of the statute passed by Congress, not 
whether wisdom or logic suggests that Congress could have done bet-
ter.”348  Thus, even though a literal reading of the statute may not be 
 
district court chose to apply the actual test instead of the hypothetical test); In re Cata-
pult, 165 F.3d at 755 (concluding that the bankruptcy court and district court erred in 
allowing the debtor-in-possession to assume the patent licenses in question); Institut 
Pasteur, 104 F.3d at 495 (affirming the bankruptcy court’s confirmation of a Chapter 11 
reorganization plan which allowed the debtor-in-possession to assume the patent li-
censes in question).   
342 Nelson v. George Wong Pension Trust (In re Nelson) 391 B.R. 437, 452 (B.A.P. 
9th Cir. 2008).  
343 See Lamie v. U.S. Tr., 540 U.S. 526, 542 (2004) (“If Congress enacted into law 
something different from what it intended, then it should amend the statute to con-
form it to its intent.”); Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Union Planters Bank, N.A., 
530 U.S. 1, 13-14 (2000) (“Achieving a better policy outcome . . . is a task for Congress, 
not the courts.”).  
344 See United States v. Noland, 517 U.S. 535, 542 n.3 (1996) (“[I]t is up to Con-
gress, not this Court, to revise the [policy] if it so chooses.”); Union Bank v. Wolas, 502 
U.S. 151, 162 (1991) (“Whether Congress has wisely balanced . . . sometimes conflict-
ing policies . . . is not a question that we are authorized to decide.”). 
345 See In re Catapult, 165 F.3d at 754 (holding that the actual test “effectively en-
grafts a narrow exception onto § 365(c)(1)” and pointing out that it “reads the word 
‘assume’ out of subsection (c) with respect to debtors in possession” (citing In re Fa-
strax, Inc., 129 B.R. 274, 277 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1991))).  
346 Id.  
347 Sigmon Coal Co. v. Apfel, 226 F.3d 291, 308 (4th Cir. 2000).  
348 Id. 
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fully aligned with the goals of Chapter 11, a court cannot depart from 
the plain, unambiguous language of the statute simply because it disa-
grees with the policy effects of such an interpretation. 
V.  THE LITERAL READING AS A CREDITOR-PROTECTION MEASURE 
Though advocates of the actual test argue that the literal reading 
undermines the goals of bankruptcy, the statute’s effect on the com-
peting interest in federal patent law is equally important.  The Ameri-
can bankruptcy system operates in a specialized court, with its own set 
of rules set forth in the Bankruptcy Code.349  Because the umbrella of 
the Bankruptcy Code creates a unique relationship between debtors 
and creditors, the Code must focus on balancing the debtor’s and cred-
itor’s interests.350  The literal reading of section 365(c)(1)(A) ensures 
that the federal patent interest of nonassignability is not rendered in-
operative by the competing free-assignability principle of bankruptcy 
law.351  In fact, the limitation set forth in section 365(c) is a creditor’s 
only protection against the powerful free-transferability principle of sec-
tion 365(f), which seeks to maximize the debtor’s estate and facilitate 
reorganization.352 
Without section 365(c), a patent owner would have no protection 
against an infringer who obtained a patent license from a bankrupt 
debtor-licensee.  Once the infringer has acquired a license for the pa-
tented invention, the nondebtor patent owner no longer has the pow-
er to sue for infringement.353  Losing control over which entities it can 
sue effectively eliminates a patentee’s right to exclude. 
Within the context of section 365(c), the federal common law prin-
ciple of nontransferability can be viewed as a creditor-protection meas-
ure.  From an equitable perspective, a creditor patent owner should not 
be divested of its exclusive monopoly simply because its licensee, 
 
349 These rules are codified in Title 11 of the United States Code.  Congress passed 
the Bankruptcy Code under its Constitutional grant of authority to “establish . . . uni-
form Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States.”  U.S. CONST. 
art. I, § 8, cl. 4. 
350 For further discussion of these interests, see supra Section I.B. 
351 For a discussion of the factors that led to the inclusion of the patent clause in 
the U.S. Constitution, see Craig Allen Nard & Andrew P. Morriss, Constitutionalizing 
Patents:  From Venice to Philadelphia, 2 REV. L. & ECON. 223, 299-304 (2006), available at 
http://www.bepress.com/rle/vol2/iss2/art4.   
352 See 11 U.S.C. § 365(c), (f) (2006). 
353 See supra Section II.B (explaining that a patent license is merely a promise not 
to sue for infringement).  
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through no fault of the creditor patent owner, falls into bankruptcy.354  
Furthermore, a creditor patent owner has economic incentives for 
wanting its patented technology to be readily available to consumers via 
the debtor-licensee.355  If the debtor-licensee can no longer meet this 
obligation, then the creditor patent owner should be free to reject the 
license and grant a new license to another entity that is better posi-
tioned to bring the end product to the market.356  Further, this exer-
cise of control is consistent with Congress’s treatment of patent policy 
and its intent to encourage innovation in exchange for the right to 
exclude, a proposition that forms the backbone of the American pa-
tent system.357  Under no circumstances should the creditor patent 
owner be compelled to allow a third party to use its license.  Such 
compulsion would threaten to undermine the foundation of the en-
tire patent system.358 
A.  Patents Are a Property Right 
It has been settled for more than a century that the rights secured 
by a patent are property, and that patent property rights are no differ-
ent in the eyes of the Constitution than any other property right.359  As 
the Supreme Court held in Consolidated Fruit-Jar Co. v. Wright, “[a] pa-
tent for an invention is as much property as a patent for land.  The 
 
354 See Waterman v. Mackenzie, 138 U.S. 252, 255 (1891) (“In equity, as at law, when 
the transfer amounts to a license only, the title remains in the owner of the patent . . . .”). 
355 For example, the creditor patent holder may wish to receive royalties or trade 
secrets based upon research, sale, or development of the patented invention.  
356 Some critics argue that the literal reading of section 365(c) would provide a 
windfall for the nondebtor:  if the debtor is outside of bankruptcy, then the nondebtor 
does not have the option to reject the license; if, however, the debtor files for bank-
ruptcy, then the nondebtor can reclaim the license and potentially resell it at a higher 
market rate.  See N.C.P. Mktg. Group, Inc. v. BG Star Prods., Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1577, 1578 
(2009) (denying petition for certiorari) (statement of Kennedy, J.) (discussing this 
possible windfall, along with competing concerns about the actual test, but concluding 
that this “is not the most suitable case for [the Court’s] resolution of the conflict”). 
357 See supra Part II.  
358 For example, in Institut Pasteur v. Cambridge Biotech Corp., the circuit court al-
lowed the sale of the debtor’s stock to a competitor of the creditor but refused to allow 
the creditor-licensor to reject the patent license.  104 F.3d 489, 493-94 (1st Cir. 1997).  
Effectively, this enabled the competitor to gain use of the licensor’s patented technol-
ogy when the creditor would never have offered such a license in the first instance.  See 
id. at 493 (noting plaintiff’s argument that “in substance” this was a cross-license to a 
“complete stranger”).  
359 Mach. Co. v. Murphy, 97 U.S. 120, 121 (1877) (“Rights secured to an inventor 
by letters-patent are property . . . .”); Ethicon, Inc. v. U.S. Surgical Corp., 135 F.3d 
1456, 1470 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (Newman, J., dissenting) (“The law of patent ownership 
has its roots in the common law of property . . . .”). 
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right rests on the same foundation, and is surrounded and protected by 
the same sanctions.”360  For example, patent infringement constitutes a 
“taking” of patent property similar to a “taking” of real property.361 
A strong analogy can be drawn between a patent license, granting 
a right to invade the exclusive possession of patent property, and an 
easement over a piece of real property, granting the right to commit 
trespass.362  Since the essence of trespass is the invasion of a person’s 
interest in the exclusive possession of land,363 the landowner may not 
bring an action for trespass against the person who has acquired an 
easement over the land in question.364  Similarly, a patent licensee can 
be viewed as one with an easement over the patent owner’s patent 
rights.  In granting the licensee the “easement,” the patent owner for-
goes the right to sue the licensee for patent infringement. 
The holder of an easement, however, can commit an actionable 
trespass by exceeding its rights under the easement.365  For example, if 
the easement holder misuses or deviates from the easement, this can 
constitute unauthorized use.366  Likewise, if the easement is limited in 
scope or purpose, the easement holder can become a trespasser by 
 
360 94 U.S. 92, 96 (1876). 
361 See Dowagiac Mfg. Co. v. Minn. Moline Plow Co., 235 U.S. 641, 648 (1915) (stat-
ing that “the exclusive right conferred by the patent [is] property and the infringe-
ment [is] a tortious taking of a part of that property”).  
362 “A ‘trespass’ occurs when there is an actionable interference with possession of 
land.”  Phillips v. Rathbone, 93 P.3d 835, 839 (Or. Ct. App. 2004) (citing Smejkal v. 
Empire Lite-Rock, Inc., 547 P.2d 1363 (Or. 1976)). 
363 See, e.g., Poff v. Hayes, 763 So. 2d 234, 240 (Ala. 2000) (clarifying that trespass 
“is a wrong against the right of possession” (quoting Jefferies v. Bush, 608 So. 2d 361, 
362 (Ala. 1992))); Munsey v. Hanly, 67 A. 217, 217 (Me. 1907) (“The gist of the action 
of trespass . . . is the disturbance of the possession.”); Lane v. Mims, 70 S.E.2d 244, 246 
(S.C. 1952) (noting that “the action of trespass . . . is founded upon possession”); Aus-
tin v. Hallstrom, 86 A.2d 549, 549 (Vt. 1952) (“The gist of the action of trespass upon 
the freehold is the injury to the possession.”). 
364 See, e.g., Simcox v. Hunt, 874 So. 2d 1010, 1018-19 (Miss. Ct. App. 2004) (explain-
ing that easements confer a right of use and trespass requires entrance without a right). 
365 See, e.g., Tice v. Herring, 717 So. 2d 181, 182 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (explain-
ing that the “burden of [an] easement . . . may not ordinarily extend beyond that which 
was reasonably contemplated with the creation of the easement”); Schadewald v. Brulé, 
570 N.W.2d 788, 795 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997) (noting that a party cannot unilaterally in-
crease the burden of an easement); Reinbott v. Tidwell, 191 S.W.3d 102, 109 (Mo. Ct. 
App. 2006) (explaining that if an easement holder exceeds his right of use “he is guilty 
of trespass” (quoting Smith v. Woodard, 15 S.W.3d 768, 773 (Mo. Ct. App. 2000))). 
366 See, e.g., Apel v. Katz, 697 N.E.2d 600, 607 (Ohio 1998) (affirming a jury verdict 
that a person who had a roadway easement across adjacent property, but had used a 
portion of the property outside the easement, had trespassed). 
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exceeding the bounds of the easement.367  Most important to the issue 
at hand, real property also recognizes that the existence of an ease-
ment does not justify an entry by a trespassing third party.368 
Similar to an easement in real property, a patent license limits the 
scope and use of the licensee, and any deviation from the license con-
stitutes an act of infringement.369  Additionally, as with an easement, a 
patent owner is protected from unauthorized infringement by “a tres-
passing third party” through injunctive relief. 
B.  Patent Law’s Injunctive Relief Against Infringers 
The patent system’s reward of injunctive relief against patent in-
fringers further justifies allowing a creditor patent owner to compel 
the rejection of a license.  Prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in 
eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C.,370 a patent owner was automatically 
granted an injunction preventing the infringer from continuing to 
make, use, or sell the patented technology upon a finding of in-
fringement.371  Even after eBay, although a permanent injunction does 
not automatically follow from a finding of infringement, a patent 
owner can still obtain a permanent injunction if it satisfies the four-
factor test historically employed by courts of equity.372  Thus, the credi-
tor patent owner’s right to prohibit assumption or assignment of the 
license is similar to a patent owner’s right to obtain an injunction 
against infringers.  Both remedies operate as an equitable form of 
 
367 See, e.g., Conner v. Lucas, 920 P.2d 171, 175 (Or. Ct. App. 1996) (finding that 
planting trees on a roadway easement was a trespass because this use was inconsistent 
with the use of the property as a roadway). 
368 See, e.g., Tusa v. Cablevision, 691 N.Y.S.2d 105, 106 (App. Div. 1999) (holding 
that where a utility easement was for the benefit of homeowners in a subdivision, the 
installation of a line for the benefit of an owner outside the subdivision was a trespass). 
369 Cf. Conner, 920 P.2d at 175 (finding the defendant liable for misuse of an ease-
ment). 
370 547 U.S. 388 (2006). 
371 See MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 401 F.3d 1323, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2005) 
(noting the “general rule that courts will issue permanent injunctions against patent 
infringement absent exceptional circumstances”), vacated, 547 U.S. 388.  
372 See eBay, 547 U.S. at 391 (detailing the four-factor test).  A recent study pub-
lished in IPToday.com found that, post-eBay, district courts were still granting injunc-
tive relief over seventy percent of the time.  See Ernest Grumbles, III, Rachel C. Hughey 
& Susan Perera, The Three Year Anniversary of eBay v. MercExchange:  A Statistical Analysis 
of Permanent Injunctions, INTELL. PROP. TODAY, Nov. 2009, available at http://www. 
iptoday.com/issues/2009/11/articles/three-year-anniversary-eBay-MercExchange.asp 
(finding that out of 67 district court injunction decisions, 48 (72%) granted relief 
while 19 (28%) denied relief).  
YING_FINAL REVISED.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 3/17/2010  10:18 AM 
1280 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 158: 1225 
protecting the fundamental right to exclude, which is embodied in 
the federal common law principle of patent nontransferability. 
The development of patent law has a historical foundation in real 
property.  Further, the Constitution recognizes the importance of 
strong patent protection in order to foster innovation and develop-
ment for the public.373  In a bankruptcy proceeding, however, this fed-
eral patent interest is weighed against the competing interests of gen-
eral bankruptcy policies.  Although those who criticize a literal reading 
of section 365(c) argue that such a reading undermines the general 
goals of bankruptcy, they overlook the importance of balancing the 
other federal interests at stake—namely, those of patent law.  Thus, 
while a literal reading of the statute may not protect the debtor to the 
fullest extent possible, it best protects the creditor patent owner. 
CONCLUSION 
There is an inherent tension between the federal common law 
principle of patent nontransferability and the free-transferability prin-
ciple codified in section 365(f) of the Bankruptcy Code.  Because the 
federal principle of patent nonassignability protects the nondebtor li-
censor from having to accept performance from, or render perfor-
mance to, an entity other than that with which it originally contracted, 
it falls under the “applicable law” exception of section 365(c).  Courts 
have struggled to reconcile these two competing interests.  Courts have 
developed two main tests in applying these provisions:  the hypotheti-
cal test, which takes a literal reading of the statute, and the actual test, 
which overrides the literal reading of the statute in favor of the general 
goals of bankruptcy policy.  Some members of the Supreme Court have 
recognized the need to reconcile these two competing approaches.374  
To date, however, the Court has not found a suitable case for address-
ing this question, leaving the issue to the lower courts for now.375 
 
373 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; supra Part II. 
374 See N.C.P. Mktg. Group, Inc. v. BG Star Prods., Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1577 (2009) 
(denying petition for certiorari) (statement of Kennedy, J.). 
375 Justice Kennedy recognized the importance of finding a suitable case: 
The division in the courts over the meaning of [section] 365(c)(1) is an im-
portant one to resolve for Bankruptcy Courts and for businesses that seek re-
organization.  This petition for certiorari, however, is not the most suitable 
case for our resolution of the conflict. . . . In a different case the Court should 
consider granting certiorari on this significant question. 
Id. at 1578. 
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After In re Footstar, some courts have departed from the two tradi-
tional tests.  These courts have instead taken a third view, opting to ap-
ply neither the hypothetical test nor the actual test but ultimately reach-
ing the same outcome that would result under the actual test.  Despite 
this, some commentators believe that In re Footstar and its progeny offer 
a middle ground between the hypothetical and actual tests.376 
The courts that have adopted the actual test overlook the impor-
tance of the nondebtor’s patent rights—rights that should be placed 
at the forefront as a protective measure against the debtor-friendly 
broad power of free transferability.  In considering the justifications 
for adopting a particular interpretation of the statute, these courts 
should consider, in addition to the general goals of bankruptcy, the 
competing interests of federal patent law. 
An examination of the plain language of the statute clearly indi-
cates that the hypothetical test is the correct approach, even if it is not 
as favorable to the debtor-licensee.  Furthermore, the legislative histo-
ry of the statute does not justify departing from the plain-meaning in-
terpretation of the statute.  Finally, the hypothetical test better pro-
tects the patent interest of the nondebtor licensor by prohibiting 
assumption or assignment of the patent license. 
 
 
376 See, e.g., Kuney, supra note 17, at 154 (“It may . . . strike the correct balance be-
tween the needs of owners and licensees.”).  
